Learning lessons from conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia, and India’s Operation Sindoor, and also that China has its PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) for long, and Pakistan has recently started a force on similar lines, Indian Army proposes to have its own rocket and missile force. Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi, during the Army Day media briefing, mentioned that the Indian Army was looking at raising a rocket-cum-missile force, which was the “need of the hour”. Earlier, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, had also mooted the need for such a force at the tri-service level.
Missile use and development has seen a renaissance in growing non-contact warfare. Justifying the need for such a force, the Army Chief underlined that in modern warfare, rockets and missiles have become interdependent on each other. While the terms rocket and missile are often used interchangeably, a rocket is a propulsion system or an unguided projectile, while a missile is typically a more complex, guided weapon that often uses a rocket for propulsion, delivering a warhead to a specific target with accuracy.
Russia has had rocket forces for long, and in fact, Chinese forces are modelled on the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces. Iran too has a huge rocket force, the largest in West Asia. In India, some in the Indian Army (IA) have been pushing for some years, but both the IA and the Indian Air Force (IAF) want to hold weapons under their own command for service-specific targets.
The Indian Armed Forces possess a diverse arsenal of indigenous and jointly developed missiles, including Agni, BrahMos, Prithvi, Pralay, and several others. Recently, it tested the Pinaka long-range guided rocket, which has a maximum range of 120 km. Currently, IA’s missile and rocket inventory is handled by the Corps of Army Air Defence (AAD) and the artillery regiments. The IAF and Indian Navy (IN) have their own inventories. Since Op Sindoor, where India effectively used missiles to strike terror camps and military targets deep inside Pakistan, New Delhi has been focusing on enhancing its long-range strike capabilities.
People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second Artillery Corps, is the strategic and tactical missile force of China. It controls China’s land-based ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. The PLARF is under the direct command of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and has its headquarters in Beijing. The PLARF is staffed by 120,000 personnel. The six operational Bases (corps level) are independently deployed in the five Theatres throughout China, and each controls a number of brigades. Bases have peacetime administrative control of nuclear forces. The operational control of all nuclear forces is directly with the CMC. Control over conventional rocket forces is with theatre commands.
As of 2024, China has the largest land-based missile arsenal in the world. Assets include around 400 ground-launched cruise missiles, 900 conventionally armed short-range ballistic missiles, 1,300 medium-range ballistic missiles, 500 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Many of these are extremely accurate, which would allow them to destroy targets even without nuclear warheads. China has a stockpile of approximately 600 nuclear warheads and is growing toward 1,000 by 2030. It is not only growing and modernising its nuclear assets, but also testing them.
China’s missile arsenal and hypersonic technology are far ahead of India, as it is working to catch up and match with the US and Russia. India, which has around 180 nuclear warheads, and significant conventional missile inventory, is way ahead of Pakistan in terms of the quality and range of its missiles.
Russian Rocket Forces
Russia’s rocket forces are split between the land-based Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), a distinct branch for strategic nuclear deterrence, and conventional missile units integrated within the Ground, Aerospace, and Naval Forces, for tactical and operational roles. The RVSN utilises secure and redundant automated systems like Signal for launch. Conventional forces emphasise mobile brigades and layered defence. Ground Forces have tactical and operational missile systems such as the highly mobile Iskander, and newer hypersonic Oreshnik, for theatre-level operations. Aerospace Forces (VKS) control air-launched cruise missiles including the Kh-101/102, hypersonic missiles such as the Kinzhal, precision-guided munitions, and specialised air-to-surface missiles like the Kh-29 series for various targets. The Russian Navy has the Kalibr family for anti-ship and land-attack roles, and the advanced Zircon (Tsirkon) hypersonic missile being integrated into frigates. The Navy also manages the sea-based nuclear deterrent (submarines/missiles).
There is a shift towards more flexible, mobile brigades for rapid deployment across vast distances. Emphasis is on integrated, layered defence and offence, with missile forces (both strategic and conventional) playing a key role in disrupting enemy C2 and achieving strategic effects. Russia has also created a separate Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) within their armed forces.
The US Rocket and Missile Forces
The US doesn’t have a single “Rocket Force Command” like China’s PLARF, but rather its space and missile capabilities are distributed. The US Space Force handles space assets and missile warning, the US Army manages ground-based rockets/missiles (like ATACMS), and the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) oversees nuclear deterrence, with Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) managing bomber/missile wings, while US Space Command (USSPACECOM) directs space operations.
PLARF is a centralized command for all its ground-based conventional and nuclear missiles. In contrast, the US distributes its rocket and missile functions across different services and commands, with the US Space Force providing critical early warning and space support for these systems.
Pakistan Army Rocket Force Command
After the Op Sindoor setback, Pakistan has begun the process of setting up the Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) to boost long-range missile capabilities. The proposal for the new force was approved at a recent Corps Commanders’ Conference, chaired by Pakistan’s first Chief of Defence Forces, General Asim Munir, with formalisation expected in the coming months. It is a command of the Pakistan Army tasked with controlling and operating conventional rockets and missiles, including cruise, ballistic, and future hypersonic missiles. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced the ARFC’s formation on 13 August 2025.
The ARFC will consolidate conventional and rocket units from several formations and specialist detachments into a single operational command, mirroring the Pakistan Army Strategic Forces Command. It will be a high-tech formation aimed at improving missile-based deterrence and strike capacity. The force is being modelled broadly on China’s Rocket Force, but it will be a tactical and conventional missile force, and not hold nuclear weapons. It will come directly under Army Headquarters in Chaklala, Punjab. It will have the Fatah-I, Fatah-II, and Fatah-4 (750 km cruise missile under testing) to begin with. It will not be a tri-service command, but an Army Command.
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force
Iran has a potent and mighty rocket-missile force that functions in parallel to the regular Iranian Air Force (IRIAF). The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force (IRGCASF), established way back in 2009, is responsible for the operation of Iran’s sophisticated missile arsenal, which includes ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles. The force functions separately from the military and reports directly to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, and also oversees drone combat operations.
Iran is believed to have nearly 3,000 ballistic missiles, the largest inventory in the Middle East, and considered a significant element of deterrence. The force uses Iran’s vast underground tunnel networks for storage and often launches from concealed locations. They often fire retaliatory barrages of missiles at Israel.
Conventional Deterrence – India Context
Since its inception, nuclear weapons have greatly changed and shaped the modern concept of deterrence. Conventional deterrence is largely a function of military strategy and has comparatively little political involvement. The main objective of nuclear deterrence is to prevent the adversary from taking certain action by threatening to inflict massive nuclear retaliation, and is based on politically driven nuclear doctrines. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) theory had shaped nuclear deterrence. India has adopted and followed the No First Use (NFU) policy for its nuclear weapons. Pakistan does not follow NFU and has instead made it clear that it will use nuclear weapons for both conventional and nuclear aggression against it by India. It is meant to deter India’s conventional superiority. China maintains NFU and enjoys both a conventional and nuclear power advantage over India.
Conventional wars are now taking place under a nuclear overhang. Therefore, even nuclear-armed nations have to more heavily invest in conventional capabilities. India continues to suffer proxy war by both China and Pakistan. Establishment of the Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) is being proposed to enhance non-contact warfare capacity. It is meant to provide deterrence. How it will actually increase deterrence vis-à-vis the current arrangement and force structures is not clear and needs more deliberation.
The Proposed Indian Integrated Rocket Force
Nuclear weapons are not for use. Issues like nuclear doctrine and conventional asymmetry necessitate India strengthening its conventional deterrence. The CDS and Army Chief have been driving the Integrated Rocket Force (IRF). India would like to have clear segregation between strategic (nuclear) and conventional rocket forces. The nuclear vector will remain under the Strategic Forces Command (SFC). The conventional long-range rockets and missiles could be integrated under a unified command, consisting of systems like Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher (currently 120 km), Pralay tactical ballistic missile (up to 500 km), and ground-based BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles (currently 400 km), capable of delivering high, decisive impact. Most of these will come from the IA’s inventory, which the Army is reluctant to shed. Air-launched missiles will remain with the IAF. IAF will be expected to shed Prithvi-II short-range ballistic missiles and the unit of land-based BrahMos cruise missiles. Similarly, coastal and sea-launched missiles will remain with the Indian Navy. There will be a need for clarity in the Command and Control (C2) structure. Will it be Army-centric, or a tri-service command under the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC)? With significant missiles with the individual services, and also air-launched cruise missiles, and also long-range artillery, will it bring complexity to TBA (tactical battle area) management? All this will have to be evaluated.
To Summarise
The recent conflicts, both in Ukraine and the ones in the Middle East, have firmly underscored the growing role of missiles and drones in modern warfare. India’s two adversary neighbours China and Pakistan already have dedicated Rocket Forces. With India facing a two-front threat, it is time for the Indian security establishment to analyse the current resistance to creating a combined force.
The Army Chief has mentioned the IRF only in the context of the Indian Army. “Initially the rocket force will be under the artillery. As and when it increases based on the size, scope and the command control, this will see a different avatar,” underscored Gen. Dwivedi. The CDS is looking at a tri-service force. Is it required to be at the army level or is it required directly at the level of the MoD or at the level of CDS (Chief of Defence Staff)? This is the question that needs to be decided.
There will be issues between the IRF and tri-services about command and control regarding in-service projectiles and launchers. Neither the IA nor the IAF would be willing to let go of their command over their missile systems, which are embedded in their tactical plans. If each service maintains its own missiles, then there will be duplication with the IRF.
The IRF cannot just take over the weapon platforms. It will require intelligence, targeting, and other capabilities, which are currently shared within the service. This may also add to duplication. With theaterisation issues still to be sorted out, IRF could add another layer of complications and heartburn.
In the case of the PLARF, by controlling both conventional and nuclear missiles, they create ambiguity for the adversaries of China. Further, China has placed its tactical and strategic nuclear missiles at the same locations, complicating risk and response further. In India, not only are the nukes with the SFC, but the civilian organisations like the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) still play a significant role in custody and release procedures related to nuclear weapons.
Other than China, most militaries have kept the strategic and tactical missile forces clearly separated. In the case of China, the control of all nuclear weapons is with the CMC, but they do not have a separate strategic force. India has many global models of rocket forces to study. Finally, the structure will have to be India-centric. Will the IRF bolster India’s A2/AD capabilities along the Himalayas and on its Western Border; will it be more cost-efficient; and will it enhance deterrence are issues that need to be ironed out before the leap.
Note: The article was originally written by the Author for Russia Today on 25th, January 2026, it has since been updated.
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