The US lost nearly $2B worth of military equipment in the first 4 days of operations in Iran. Losses include SATCOM terminals, F-15E Strike Eagles, and radar equipment. The chief driver of the cost is a US AN/FPS-132 early warning radar system at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, valued at $1.1 billion, which was hit and partially damaged in a missile strike on 28 February. Qatar confirmed that the radar was hit and damaged. Iran also struck the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, destroying two satellite communications terminals and several large buildings. Iranian missile strikes, also destroyed or severely damaged a U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar system associated with a THAAD battery at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan in early March 2026. The AN/TPY-2 radar component of the THAAD Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM System) deployed at Al-Ruwais Industrial City in the United Arab Emirates was also hit, and the destroyed radar component is estimated to be worth $300 million. Iran used a combination of precision-guided missiles and one-way attack drones to target and destroy AN/TPY-2 radar systems
The failure of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) to establish a comprehensive SEAD campaign in the initial days of the 2022 Ukraine war was a critical factor in preventing a rapid Russian victory. Despite having superior numbers and technology, Russia failed to destroy Ukraine’s Ground-Based Air Defence System (GBADS), leading to a “mutual air denial” scenario that grounded most Russian fixed-wing aircraft and forced them into dangerous low-altitude.
On January 3, 2026, the U.S. executed “Operation Absolute Resolve”, a swift, massive SEAD campaign in Venezuela involving over 150 aircraft, including F-35s and EA-18G Growlers, to neutralise Russian-supplied S-300/Buk systems and Chinese radars. This electronically dominated assault blinded defences within 12 minutes, allowing for the capture of Nicolas Maduro.
India’s S-400 Triumf air defence system proved its worth as a strategic game-changer during Operation Sindoor. The S-400‘s exceptional mobility was a key element of its success. Even when its locations were reportedly identified by Pakistan, likely using Chinese satellite intelligence, the Indian crews were able to rapidly relocate the batteries. From all the above, it is clear that while it is important to neutralise enemy air defence systems, their defence itself has become a challenge.
Suppression of Enemy Air Defences
SEAD refers to military actions designed to neutralize, degrade, or destroy ground-based enemy air defence systems, including radar and surface-to-air missiles (SAM systems). SEAD missions are critical for establishing air superiority, ensuring aircraft survival, and allowing freedom of movement during air campaigns. The most successful SEAD operations in history include the 1991 Gulf War, where coalition forces paralyzed Iraq’s air defences in hours, utilising massive amounts of AGM-88 HARM missiles, cruise missiles, and electronic jamming to neutralise Iraqi Command and Control (C2 systems) and radar systems instantly. During the 1982 Bekaa Valley conflict (Operation Mole Cricket 19), the Israeli Air Force flawlessly destroyed 17-19 Syrian SA-6 SAM batteries in roughly two hours using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision strikes.
In the Vietnam War (1965–1968), US forces pioneered modern SEAD in response to Soviet-made S-75 (SA-2) missiles, creating specialized “Wild Weasel” aircraft to hunt and destroy radar sites, reducing the SAM success rate from 5.7 percent to less than 1 percent. In Operation Allied Force (Kosovo, 1999), despite challenging, mobile, and adaptive Serbian defences, NATO successfully used extensive, prolonged SEAD to limit the threat to aircraft throughout the campaign. Turkey demonstrated advanced, modern SEAD by deploying the KORAL electronic warfare system to create a no-fly zone, effectively disrupting Syrian air defence capabilities during the Syrian Civil War (2020).
Key elements of the success of SEAD are an integrated approach combining kinetic (missiles, bombs) with non-kinetic (jamming, cyber) attacks. Use of dedicated aircraft like the F-4G Wild Weasel, EA-6B Prowler, F-16CJ, and EA-18G Growlers helps. Rapid adaptation and modifying tactics to counter enemy “radar on/off” and other Electronic Counter-Counter techniques. Understanding SEAD helps develop defensive counters to protect GBADS.
India’s SEAD in Op Sindoor
During Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the Indian Air Force (IAF) executed SEAD to neutralise Pakistani radar and missile sites, facilitating safe passage for precision strikes on terror infrastructure. Key elements included utilising anti-radiation missiles (ARM) to disable enemy radar and deploying advanced fighter jets, including Rafales and Su-30MKIs, supported by Netra AEW&C systems.
India targeted Pakistani air defence systems, including radars in Lahore and surrounding areas, to gain air superiority. The IAF employed a mix of precision-guided munitions, including SCALP cruise missiles, BrahMos, and Crystal Maze missiles. Electronic warfare was used to jam radar signals, blinding Pakistani SAMs. The SEAD missions were part of a broader calibrated response. The operation highlighted the integration of systems, such as the S-400 and Akash missile, in creating a layered defence, while Rafale fighters maintained a protective umbrella.
Key Elements of GBADS
GBADS are designed to detect, track, identify, and neutralize aerial threats, ranging from low-flying drones to high-altitude missiles, and are based on ground or sea surface. Modern GBADS relies on a layered defence, multi-domain, and, frequently, mobile architecture to protect civilian populations, critical infrastructure, and military forces.
Detection and surveillance (Sensors) is through a network of advanced radar (long-range for early warning, short-range for tracking) and EO/IR sensors. These sensors provide a real-time Common Operating Picture (COP) to distinguish hostile targets from friendly aircraft or civilian traffic.
The C2 systems are the central nervous system of GBADS, connecting sensors with launchers to allow for rapid decision-making, threat prioritisation, and the coordination of multiple weapons simultaneously. The engagement is done by the “effectors”, which include MANPADS, short-range, medium, and long-range SAM systems. Anti-Aircraft guns are used for close-in, high-rate-of-fire defence, particularly against drones.
Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) include high-energy lasers or microwaves used to disable drones or sensors with minimal collateral damage. The concept of layered defence is to deploy radars and effectors in a complementary manner to cover different altitudes and ranges, ensuring there are no blind spots, particularly at low altitudes.
Electronic Warfare (EW) & Counter-UAS requires jammers and spoofers designed to interfere with drone communication, navigation, and seeker instrumentation.
Mobility and agility are critical, providing flexible, Shoot-and-Scoot tactics. This is achieved through tracked or wheeled vehicle integration, as is the case in most modern systems such as the MIM-104 Patriot (PAC-3) (USA, long-range), S-400, SA-6 Gainful (Russia), Akash, MR-SAM/LR-SAM, SAMAR (India), Khordad 15, Bavar-373 (Iran), Iron Dome, SPYDER (Israel), and Chinese HQ-9, among many others.
Detection requires active/passive radars, EO/IR sensors, and acoustic sensors. Guidance requires radar-guided, infrared-homing, and un-jammable laser-guided systems. Integration requires open, modular architectures and secure communications that allow for interoperability between different systems.
Operational Mobility and Deception
Shoot-and-Scoot tactics, which include frequently moving radar and launcher units, prevent enemies from locking onto their positions. Deploying mock-up radars and inflatable decoys confuses enemy sensors and wastes their precision-guided munitions. Radar Emission Control (EMCON) involves minimising active radar scans, making the system harder to detect. Instead, use passive sensors, or if an anti-radiation missile (ARM) is detected, shut down the radar entirely. Use decoy emitters to try to mask where the actual missile site emitters are.
Integrated Layered Air Defence System
Active layered defence is a mix of systems to create a multi-layered shield, long-range for ballistic missiles, medium-range for aircraft, and CIWS for drones. Point defence integration involves position CIWS, such as anti-aircraft guns or short-range missiles, specifically to protect radar sites from incoming cruise missiles and drones. Major militaries tier their air defence systems and have shorter-range missiles and guns arrayed ‘up-threat’ or along likely strike ingress routes to protect a longer-ranged area air defence system.
Electronic Warfare (EW) Protection
Defending AD systems from jamming involves a combination of ECCM to maintain radar functionality, tactical manoeuvres to avoid detection, and technological upgrades to operate in denied environments. Modern strategies focus on agility, mobility, and redundancy to counter jamming attempts.
Jamming and Spoofing are also used to disrupt the guidance systems of anti-radiation missiles (ARM) and drones. Signature management involves reducing the electromagnetic signature of radars, making them harder to detect by passive electronic support measures (ESM).
If a ground-based radar cannot “prevent” jamming, they try to minimise the effect of the jamming. Power output can be manipulated to reduce transmissions for a more effective, shorter operational range for a small duration. The next option is to employ both spread spectrum and frequency agility. It’s much harder to jam a radar using multiple frequencies at once. Even harder if they are frequency bands, and you are also jumping the spot frequency around in each band. Once the jammer has managed to output RF energy enough to totally block the radar’s use of either or both triangulation and/or trilateration to locate the source of the jamming.
Physical Hardening and Concealment
Hardened sites include the construction of bunkers or fortified, camouflaged positions to protect launchers and radar components from air strikes. Though ultimately, the radar antennae have to be in the open for their operations. Terrain masking involves positioning systems behind hills or within forests to limit the directions from which they can be targeted.
Counter-SEAD Measures
Counter-SEAD Measures include rapid communication between radar units, fighter aircraft (CAP), and various GBADS to neutralise attacking aircraft before they can launch missiles. AI supports real-time, high-speed calculation of incoming threats, particularly for the interception of high-speed missiles. India’s S-400, Akash missile, and SPYDER systems are designed to operate in an integrated manner, allowing for both area defence and rapid-reaction, point-defence capabilities.
Protection from ARMs
Several methods are used to protect from anti-radiation missiles (ARM). Jamming and Spoofing the ARM seeker with powerful transmitters. Can also try to decoy them with offset transmitters in the same frequency range as their own AD radar. The same thing can be attempted with electronic countermeasures on the transmitters themselves. ARM can be destroyed through hard kill using its own AD systems in a layered defence. Finally, one can shut the Radar off for a short while if an arm is detected. Some militaries try to create air dominance or, at least, air superiority such that closing to within ARM release range is near impossible for the attacker.
Technological Counter-Countermeasures
Technological Counter-Countermeasures include frequency hopping with radars rapidly changing frequencies to stay ahead of jammers trying to lock onto a single band. Agile Beam-Steering in an advanced radar can shift its beam direction rapidly to avoid jamming noise. Burn-Through techniques involve: Increasing the transmitter power of the radar to overpower the jamming signal. Using advanced algorithms to filter out noise, recognize deception patterns, and distinguish true targets from false ones. Side-lobe cancellation involves designing antennas that ignore signals coming from directions other than the main, intended scanning direction. Implementing AI for automated, real-time identification of jamming types and automatic, adaptive countermeasure deployment. Physically shielding electronic components from high-power microwave or electromagnetic pulses (EMP) and moving to higher or less commonly used frequencies that are harder to jam. New anti-radiation missiles (ARM) can remember a radar’s location even if it shuts down; therefore, modern defences use advanced decoys to simulate the radar even after it is off. Glint Phenomena uses specialised, high-fidelity decoys to generate “glint” (flickering) in the ARM’s monopulse receiver, causing tracking errors. Implement GPS/GNSS spoofers to confuse navigation systems of guided munitions, causing them to miss the target.
Reducing Radar Vulnerabilities
Other than the radar antenna that has to come up in the open, most other systems must be in Hardened sites or caves. Newer technologies reduce electronic vulnerabilities. Increasing use of space-based constellations and platforms in near-space will reduce GBADS requirements. At the location, repair and spare back-ups are very important.
Wartime Repair and Maintenance Issues
Repair and maintenance of GBADS in a warzone present critical challenges that can severely degrade a military’s ability to protect its airspace. The primary issues include high battle damage, logistical bottlenecks for spare parts, and the need for rapid, in-field, damage repair solutions. Conflicts can cause geopolitical and supply chain disruptions, making it difficult to source critical spare parts. Disruptions in shipping and/or sanctions can also affect.
The high-intensity use of missiles and radars during war creates rapid, high-volume demand for consumables, which can exceed the available stock. Transporting heavy, specialised components to the front lines while under enemy fire is hazardous and time-consuming, affecting operational readiness. Damaged systems must be fixed immediately to restore protective umbrellas, as non-deployable systems create critical vulnerabilities. On-site repairs often occur in or near the combat zone, requiring highly trained, skilled technicians who can perform complex diagnostics under stress.
If a system is severely damaged, it must be recovered from the field. Tracked vehicles, such as those used in mobile GBADS, require specialised, slow, and risky recovery operations using heavy lifting gear. Legacy systems have their own repair challenges due to obsolescence and spare availability issues. Enemy jamming and cyber-attacks can disrupt the software/electronics of advanced systems, requiring specialised software support, sometimes from foreign manufacturers who may be unreachable. Long-term deployment in harsh, field environments causes structural corrosion, reducing the efficiency of radar and missile launchers.
Modern, automated air defence systems are complex; trained personnel for maintenance may be in short supply or unavailable at the front lines. These challenges demonstrate that in modern warfare, the ability to rapidly repair, maintain, and sustain GBADS is just as critical as the capability of the systems themselves.
Typical Architecture to Defend THAAD AD System
Typical systems used to defend THAAD radar and battery sites include MIM-104 Patriot (PAC-3), the primary, close-in, lower-tier defence that protects THAAD batteries, particularly the AN/TPY-2 radar, from cruise missiles, aircraft, and tactical ballistic missiles that slip past THAAD. Iron Dome acts as the lower-most tier, intercepting short-range rockets, artillery, and drones that could threaten the THAAD radar installation. David’s Sling is a mid-tier system used in tandem with THAAD and Iron Dome, capable of intercepting cruise missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. Various, sometimes undisclosed, SHORAD systems are deployed to protect the immediate vicinity of the THAAD radar against drones and low-flying threats.
IBCS is the command-and-control network that connects the THAAD battery to other defence assets (Patriot, sensors), allowing them to share data, increase the protected area, and optimise the use of interceptors. A separate AN/TPY-2 radar can be deployed in “forward-based mode” to detect threats early, feeding data to the THAAD battery to provide earlier and more accurate targeting. In regions like the Middle East, CENTCOM integrates THAAD with allied radar systems to create a “common air picture” for better situational awareness.
Radar components are often spread out, and the site is fortified to withstand debris or nearby impacts. Use of fighter aircraft (like F-35s) to provide air superiority and target drones or cruise missiles that could attack the radar. As the THAAD focuses much more on Ballistic missile defence, these systems are essential for focusing on descending missiles, which makes it vulnerable to attacks from different angles or low-altitude, high-speed cruise missiles.
To Summarise
Defending AD systems such as S-400, Patriot, or NASAMS from hard-kill weapons (loitering munitions, anti-radiation missiles (ARM), drones, and guided bombs) requires a layered defence, “onion-skin” defensive bubble approach that combines active interception, Electronic Warfare (EW), and passive survivability tactics. Modern threats, particularly suicide drones, are designed to overwhelm these systems by saturating defences. Layering defences ensures that if one system fails, another handles the threat, particularly for short-range protection of long-range assets.
For self-propelled AD systems (e.g., Pantsir, Tor), integrating vehicle-based hard-kill APS is crucial to destroy top-attack weapons or ATGMs. Hard-kill interceptors detect incoming threats (RPG/missile) using radars and launch small projectiles to neutralise them 50m away from the vehicle.
With increased threat from drones, having an effective Counter-UAS (C-UAS) is important not only for GBADS, but also for high-value ground-based political, military, and economic assets. Programmable Air Burst Munitions (ABM) that explode near the target, releasing sub-projectiles to increase the kill probability of incoming missiles or drones. New solutions provide 360-degree detection and 90-degree elevation to protect against drones coming directly from above.
Hiding and protecting the system when not actively shooting is vital against anti-radiation missiles (ARM). Constantly move mobile AD systems to confuse enemy intelligence regarding their location. Turn off radars (emitters) when an arm is detected, forcing the weapon to lose its lock. Deploy replica decoys (e.g., inflatable dummies) of radars and launchers to attract expensive, high-quality ammunition. Protect critical components using sandbags, earth berms, or netting to camouflage assets and reduce the blast impact of nearby hits.
High-Energy Lasers/ Microwaves offer a low cost-per-shot against cheap drones, using laser beams to burn through airframes or microwave pulses to destroy drone electronics. Autonomous Swarm Interceptors utilising AI-driven, autonomous drones that can intercept incoming drone swarms at a significantly lower cost than using, for instance, a multimillion-dollar Patriot missile.
Iran has used cruise missiles and Shahid-136 class ($50,000) kamikaze drones to target the THAAD radar. Clearly, the war is getting democratised with less powerful nations being able to use cheap drones to hit expensive GBADS. There will thus be a need to have a fresh look at the approach to the defence of GBADS, and cost-to-effect ratios.
Note: The article was originally written by the Author for The Eurasian Times on 8th March 2026; it has since been updated.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
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