Japan had officially eased its post-World War II, decades-long ban on exporting lethal weapons. The government approved new guidelines allowing the export of defence equipment including fighter jets, missiles, and destroyers. It marked a major shift in its security policy and accelerated a move toward “remilitarization” in response to regional tensions. The policy represented a significant departure from Japan‘s long-standing, pacifist principles, aimed at building military capabilities and the defence industry.
Key Policy Shift Aspects
The new rules allowed for the export of lethal weapons, moving beyond the previous limitations that restricted sales primarily to non-combat equipment. Exports were initially restricted to 17 countries that had signed defence equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan. As of April 2026, Japan could export jointly developed or domestically produced defence hardware to key strategic partners, including the United States, India, Australia, and Southeast Asian nations. They also included the United Kingdom, Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Germany, France, Italy, UAE (United Arab Emirates), Norway, and Bangladesh (Signed in February 2026, marking the 17th). Canada and Singapore were also often included in defence alignment. The reforms, initiated to support the economic viability of domestic defence manufacturers, allowed them to expand their customer base beyond the Japan Self-Defence Forces. The policy also allowed the manufacturing of weapons from other countries under licensing deals. Japan was actively involved in joint development, such as the next-generation fighter jet project with Italy and the United Kingdom. Each proposed arms export would be evaluated by the National Security Council, with the government overseeing how the weapons were managed. In principle, Japan would not export lethal weapons to countries currently at war.
Regional Security Concerns
The move was partly driven by concerns over China’s and North Korea’s aggression, with Japan seeking to enhance its defence capabilities. As expected, the move received attention from China, which expressed concern, calling it contradictory to Japan’s identity as a peaceful nation. North Korea’s nuclear/missile advancements and frequent ballistic missile testing constituted an immediate, severe threat to Japan‘s territory and security. China’s rapid military expansion, growing naval capabilities, activities around the disputed Senkaku Islands, and assertive posture in the East and South China Seas were major concerns, often described as a challenge to regional stability. Russia‘s ongoing military activity and regional posture, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine, maintained Russia as a consistent security concern. Concerns included grey-zone threats, cybersecurity, maritime security, and economic coercion, forcing Japan to shift from pacifism toward active defence, including increased military funding, technology cooperation, and strengthened U.S. alliances. Lack of institutionalized security frameworks in the Indo-Pacific area complicated regional stability.
Japan-China Historic Animosity
Japan–China historic animosity was deeply rooted in 20th-century military conflicts, particularly the brutal Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Ongoing tensions were fuelled by disputes over wartime atrocities, such as the, and the use of chemical weapons, resulting in over 35 million Chinese casualties (wounded and deceased). China often accused Japan of failing to properly apologise, and distorting history textbooks to minimise wartime atrocities. Visits by Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honours war dead including convicted war criminals, often led to intense nationalistic sentiment and geopolitical rivalry. Beyond history, modern tensions were driven by competition for regional influence, territorial disputes (Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands), and security concerns regarding Taiwan. While economic ties were strong, the legacy of Japanese imperialism created lasting public and political resentment in China.
Concerns over US Security Umbrella
Japan relied on the U.S. security umbrella for defence against regional threats like China and North Korea. However, concerns regarding the reliability of this protection, specifically the U.S. commitment during a crisis, had intensified, leading Japan to reconsider its defence strategies, including potential, though unlikely, nuclear options. Japan had been looking to extend the security umbrella into new domains like space, where U.S. defence obligations would extend to Japan‘s satellites. A 2025 Asahi Shimbun survey indicated only 15% of Japanese respondents believed the U.S. would protect them in a crisis. The “Trump shock” and similar political shifts in the United States caused deep anxiety in Tokyo regarding the dependability of American security guarantees. Regional threats necessitated a stronger, more independent defence posture. In response to these doubts, Japan significantly loosened its long-standing restrictions on lethal weapon development and exports, allowing for the transfer of submarines, missiles, and other defence equipment. While Tokyo still viewed the U.S. alliance as indispensable while forming new security relationships, often referred to as “like-minded” partnerships. Japan did not favour a shift toward nuclear armament, but the deepening doubts in the security umbrella compelled Japan to seek greater self-reliance.
Japan’s Increased Defence Spending
Japan significantly increased its defence spending, up from the historically self-imposed 1% cap, and aimed for faster, broader technological innovation in defence. It undertook its largest military expansion since World War II, with a record ¥9 trillion ($58 billion) defence budget approved for fiscal year 2026, marking the fourth year of a five-year plan to reach 2% of GDP by 2027. Total defence spending for the five-year period starting in 2023 was projected to reach roughly ¥40 trillion to ¥43 trillion ($295–$318 billion). Japan shifted from a purely defensive posture to acquiring counterstrike capabilities, which included purchasing long-range missiles and boosting the domestic defence industry. Increasing involvement in regional maritime security and providing non-lethal equipment (e.g., UAVs, patrol vessels) to regional partners through initiatives like Official Security Assistance (OSA) was proposed.
Japan India Defence Cooperation
Japan and India significantly bolstered their defence cooperation, moving towards a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” focused on maritime security, co-development of military technology, and joint exercises, particularly driven by shared security interests in the Indo-Pacific. Key initiatives included the August 2025 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the Dharma Guardian exercises, and the JWG-DETC for defence technology, a working group holding regular meetings to facilitate B2B (business-to-business) interactions. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA – 2020) allowed logistical support, sharing of food, water, and fuel, and enhanced interoperability between forces. The target was to strengthen maritime domain awareness, law enforcement, and technology sharing. Maritime security and regional focus included collaboration in training, information sharing, and joint exercises to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific. JIMEX (Japan-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise) enhanced maritime collaboration. Dharma Guardian, the regular Army training exercises, fostered tactical interoperability. Air Exercises expanded to include joint fighter jet training. Both nations focused on the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) for shared maritime security. The Third India–Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting (Aug 2024) solidified the framework for sustained high-level defence dialogues. The growing partnership, often viewed in the context of the Quad (India, Japan, United States, Australia), aimed to enhance deterrence in the region, with future cooperation likely including advancements in AI, robotics, quantum technology and cyber defence. Both sides worked on Space Situational Awareness (SSA).
India-Japan Defence Production Interests
The recent easing of Japan’s restrictions on exporting defence technology and equipment was expected to boost India’s efforts, including the potential for co-production of military hardware under the Make in India initiative. The two nations initiated co-development, such as the Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN), for Indian naval vessels, with Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) leading integration in India. This marked a shift towards joint manufacturing. India and Japan significantly deepened their defence industrial cooperation, evolving from a buyer-seller relationship to focus on co-development and co-production of military technology. Following the August 2025 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the two nations prioritised collaborative projects in niche technology, maritime security, and supply chain resilience. India and Japan actively collaborated on projects related to AI, robotics, and Uncrewed Ground Vehicles (UGV) technologies. India invited Japanese industry participation in its defence corridors for co-development, specifically in aero-engines and tank engines. Japan had approached India to join the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), a 6th-generation fighter jet program involving Japan, Britain, and Italy, to reduce costs and strengthen Indo-Pacific ties. As part of the India-Japan Digital Partnership 2.0 (2025), companies like Renesas Electronics and CG Power established an OSAT (Outsourced Semiconductor Assembly and Test) facility in Gujarat. Toyota Tsusho was involved in a rare earth refining project in Andhra Pradesh to secure critical mineral supply chains. The 2025 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was a key update that prioritised co-development under the Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation mechanism.
Could Japan Go For Nuclear Weapons One Day?
Japan is the only country that has been the victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seeing the suffering, the Japanese had chosen not to go nuclear. But with the recent threat perception from China, which had been making aggressive forays towards Taiwan and contested Japanese Islands, there was a mindset change evolving. The motivations for going nuclear stemmed from regional threats and the growing military and nuclear capabilities of neighbouring countries, particularly China, North Korea, and Russia. There were serious doubts about what Japan had long relied on the U.S. security guarantee, known as “extended deterrence” or the “nuclear umbrella”. Concerns existed that the U.S. might not risk a nuclear conflict over issues far from its own homeland, leading some Japanese strategists to argue for an independent deterrent to ensure national survival. While public opinion historically opposed nuclear weapons due to the legacy of atomic bombings, some politicians within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) increasingly suggested that Japan should discuss or even acquire nuclear weapons to address security realities. Japan was considered a “latent nuclear power”, meaning it already possessed the advanced technology, significant stockpiles of separated plutonium, and scientific expertise to produce a basic nuclear arsenal relatively quickly, possibly within one to three years, if a political decision were made to do so.
To Summarise
The new defence export policy changes were welcomed by Japanese defence partners. The U.S. Ambassador to Japan, George Glass, called the move a “historic step” that would help enhance the defence capabilities between the allies. Recently, a group of 30 NATO representatives visited Japan to discuss further deepening ties as the U.S. commitment to the military alliance was shaken by U.S. President Donald Trump. The new policy would “ensure safety for Japan and further contribute to the peace and stability in the region and the international society as the security environment around our country rapidly changes,” Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told reporters. “The government will strategically promote defence equipment transfers to create a security environment that is desirable for Japan and to build up the industrial base that can support fighting resilience.” Philippine Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro welcomed Japan‘s rule change, saying it would provide access to defence “articles of the highest quality” that would “strengthen domestic resilience” and “contribute to regional stability through deterrence.” Germany‘s envoy to Tokyo, Petra Sigmund, said it created opportunities for deeper cooperation “with the aim of enhancing global stability”. However, as expected, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun said the global community including China would “resolutely resist Japan‘s reckless moves toward a new type of militarism.” Some opponents in Japan feared an increase in global tensions that could threaten the safety of the Japanese people. South Korea‘s foreign ministry was cautious and said Japan‘s defence policy “should ideally be carried out in a manner that upholds the spirit of the Peace Constitution while contributing to peace and stability in the region”. South Korea was colonised by Japan from 1910 until the end of World War II. Exports were earlier limited to five areas: rescue, transport, alerts, surveillance and minesweeping. The new guidelines scrapped those limits and allowed the export of equipment such as fighter jets, missiles and destroyers. Japan remained committed to strict screening and export controls to third countries and would not offer lethal weapons to countries at war, officials said, but granted that exceptions could be made to that limit. Japan‘s domestic defence industry which was hitherto considered a bad investment would get a boost. A growing number of major companies and startups were showing interest, especially in dual-use goods and drones. The government also increased funding for startups and academic research. The Indian government broadly welcomed Japan’s policy shift to ease defence export restrictions, viewing it as a significant opportunity to strengthen their “Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. New Delhi supported this move, as it facilitated increased co-development and co-production of military equipment (such as drones and naval technology) to boost technological collaboration.
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