The Pentagon Press Secretary Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder’s statement on October 13, 2024, said, “At the direction of the President, Secretary Austin authorized the deployment of a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) battery and associated crew of U.S. military personnel to Israel to help bolster Israel‘s air defences following Iran‘s unprecedented attacks against Israel on April 13 and again on October 1. The THAAD Battery will augment Israel‘s integrated air defence system. This action underscores the United States‘ ironclad commitment to the defence of Israel, and to defending Americans in Israel, from any further ballistic missile attacks by Iran. It is part of the broader adjustments the US military made in recent months to support the defence of Israel and protect Americans from attacks by Iran and Iranian-aligned militias”
This was not the first time the United States had deployed a THAAD battery to the region. The President directed the military to deploy a THAAD battery to the Middle East last year following the October 7th attacks to defend American troops and interests in the region. The United States previously deployed a THAAD battery to Israel in 2019 for training and an integrated air defence exercise. Two C-17 US military transport aircraft had already flown overnight from Alabama to the Israeli Air Force‘s Nevatim base, likely carrying THAAD equipment. It is important to understand the THAAD system and what other Air Defence Systems with Israel has.
Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD)
Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) is an American anti-ballistic missile defence system designed to intercept and destroy short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase (descent or re-entry). The THAAD interceptor carries no warhead, instead relying on its kinetic energy of impact to destroy the incoming missile. THAAD is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles during the ” terminal phase ” of their flight – the final stage before impact. This system can target missiles both inside and outside the atmosphere (endoatmospheric and exoatmospheric).
The many figures are classified. As per OSINT, the THAAD missile weighs 900 kg, is 6.17 m long, and the booster has a diameter of 340 mm (booster) and 370 mm for the kill vehicle. It uses a single-stage Pratt & Whitney solid-fuelled rocket. The operational range is 200 kilometres, and the flight ceiling is 150 km. The maximum speed is 10,000 km/h (Mach 8.2).
A unique feature of the system is that it does not carry explosive warheads. Instead, it destroys targets using kinetic energy, meaning it hits incoming missiles with force rather than detonating a warhead. The Guidance system is an Indium-antimonide imaging infrared seeker head with direct hit accuracy.
THAAD was developed after the experience of Iraq‘s Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War in 1991. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor. The THAAD flight testing began in April 1995. After many failed tests, the first successful intercepts were conducted on 10 June 1999 and 2 August 1999, against Hera missiles. Key subcontractors include Raytheon, Boeing, Honeywell, and BAE Systems, among others.
A THAAD battery consists of at least six truck-mounted launchers, each equipped with eight missiles (total 48), a fire control and communications unit, with two mobile tactical operations centres (TOCs) and the AN/TPY-2 ground-based radar. The purchase cost is $800 million per battery. The THAAD permanent locations have blast-hardened command posts with 3 levels of blast doors.
THAAD has been deployed in the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Romania, and South Korea. Both China and Russia opposed the THAAD deployment in South Korea. This would erode China‘s nuclear deterrence, which has a much smaller stockpile compared to the United States and Russia. On 17 January 2022, THAAD made its first operational interception of an incoming Houthi medium-range ballistic missile in the United Arab Emirates.
THAAD Operators and Deployments
In addition to its mainland defence, the United States deployed a THAAD unit to Hawaii, Guam, and at Wake Island in the Micronesia sub-region of the Pacific Ocean. Saudi Arabia ordered THAAD in a deal worth $15 billion. Seven fire units, each with a Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radar, two mobile tactical stations (with two spares for a total of 16), six launchers (with two spares for a total of 44), and 360 interceptor missiles. The Japanese government had shown interest, but had not yet chosen to deploy. Oman announced a deal for the acquisition of the THAAD air defence system. However, a sale had not been announced.
There had been a plan to put THAAD in Taiwan. The subject had been a geopolitical hot potato. Taiwan‘s existing early warning system, built by the manufacturer of the THAAD radar, can serve to counter China‘s missile launches. Effectively, there are only three operators: the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Oman. In the rest of the places, they are US-owned systems. The US has 7 batteries of THAAD, which will expand to 8 batteries in the future.
THAAD-ER
Lockheed Martin began developing an extended range (THAAD-ER) variant through internal funding to counter maturing threats posed by hypersonic glide vehicles that adversaries may deploy, namely the Chinese WU-14, to penetrate the gap between low- and high-altitude missile defences. The current 37 cm-diameter single-stage booster design was expanded to a 53 cm first stage for greater range with a second “kick stage” to close the distance to the target and provide improved velocity at burnout and more lateral movement during an engagement. The kill vehicle did not need redesign. The ground-based launcher would have only five missiles instead of eight.
Vulnerable parts of THAAD
The most vulnerable and highly targeted parts of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system are its AN/TPY-2 radars. These complex, multimillion-dollar tracking and discrimination nodes are vital for the system’s “ hit-to-kill ” capability, and disabling them neutralizes the battery by blinding it to incoming long-range ballistic missiles. Secondary vulnerable physical points of the THAAD launcher vehicles include the launch tube & missile canisters, and the interceptors housed within them are volatile and easily damaged by fragmentation or direct explosive impacts. The hydraulic cylinders required to erect and aim the launch tubes are exposed to damage. Engine, fuel tank, and tires: the heavy-duty trucks serving as mobile launch platforms are susceptible to mobility-killing strikes and ignition from shrapnel. Communications and Fire Control, the central node coordinating target data, is highly reliant on sensitive electronics that can be disrupted by advanced electronic warfare or direct strikes. The operational limitations also present systemic vulnerabilities, such as an “altitude gap” making it impossible for the system to engage very low-flying aero-ballistic threats or glide-phase weapons before they enter its interception envelope.
Israeli Air Defence Systems
The Arrow is a family of Israeli anti-ballistic missiles, jointly funded and produced by Israel and the United States; development of the system began in 1986 and has continued since. Undertaken by the MALAM division of the Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and Boeing, it is overseen by the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. It forms the long-range layer of Israel‘s multi-tiered missile defence system, along with David’s Sling (medium-to-long range) and Iron Dome (medium to short range) and Iron Beam (directed energy system under development).
The Arrow system consists of the joint production supersonic Arrow anti-missile interceptors, Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, the Elta EL/M-2080 ” Green Pine ” and ” Great Pine ” early-warning AESA radars, the Elisra “Golden Citron” C3I centre, and the IAI “Brown Hazelnut” launch control centre. The system is mobile and can be moved to other prepared sites.
The spaceflight upper-tier portion of Israel‘s missile defence, Arrow 3, was declared operational on January 18, 2017. Arrow 3 operates at greater speeds, greater range, and at greater altitudes than Arrow 2, intercepting ballistic missiles during the space-flight portion of their trajectory. Arrow 3 may serve as an anti-satellite weapon, which would make Israel one of the world’s few countries capable of shooting down satellites.
The Israeli Iron Dome system is not specifically an anti-ballistic missile system, as it is intended primarily to counter unguided rockets and artillery projectiles, rather than guided missiles on trajectories that take them above Earth’s atmosphere, re-entering at extreme velocities. Iron Dome uses principles that are similar to a true anti-ballistic missile system to intercept slower-moving short-range rockets and artillery projectiles, employing the Tamir missile at ranges of up to 70km and altitudes to 10km. Iron Dome also has an anti-aircraft capability.
Major Hits on THAAD Systems
Recent Iranian ballistic missile and drone strikes significantly damaged United States THAAD installations across the Middle East. The most severe blow was the destruction of a $300 million AN/TPY-2 fire-control radar at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. These coordinated attacks severely compromised the region’s air defence architecture. The critical AN/TPY-2 radar—which provides early tracking and discrimination of incoming ballistic missiles—was struck and destroyed, shifting interception responsibilities entirely to less capable Patriot systems. United Arab Emirates & Saudi Arabia: Similar THAAD-linked structures and radar sites (such as those monitored at Prince Sultan Airbase) were hit, leaving significant burn marks, charred shelters, and scattered debris. To offset the operational impact of these losses, the U.S. began relocating THAAD and Patriot systems, including emergency redeployments originating from as far away as South Korea.
Other Major Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
The other major deployed Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems include USA‘s MIM-104 Patriot (160 km range), China’s HQ-9B (250 km), India’s Advanced Air Defence (200 km), Norway and United States’ NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) (120 km), Russia’s S-300, S-400, and S-500 (600 km), Taiwan’s Sky Bow Ballistic Missile Defense System (200 km), South Korean L-SAM (Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (Block II 120 km), Iran’s Bavar-373 (200 km), and India’s under development Project Kusha (350 km).
The US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) investigated a variety of missile defense strategies, widely involving exotic technologies such as the X-ray lasers envisioned by Project Excalibur, or the Brilliant Pebbles kinetic-kill satellite system. None of the more exotic systems were pursued for prototyping.
Way Ahead
Space and near-space are seeing very large action. The number of players with big inventories of ballistic missiles is increasing. Typically, a mid-sized power like Iran has nearly 3,000 ballistic missiles. All significant powers are developing and building large Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) capabilities. Also, many countries have demonstrated Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability.
Anticipating a bigger Israel–Iran showdown, the USA had moved a THAAD system to Israel in late 2024. In placing THAAD, the US is underlining its “ironclad commitment to the defence of Israel”. The USA already has maritime ABM capability in the region.
Many countries in West Asia have secured themselves with ABM systems. Interestingly, Ukraine had been requesting a THAAD battery for a long time to defend itself against Russia, but had been refused.
THAAD provides a “rapidly deployable capability against ballistic missiles. Employing “ hit-to-kill ” technology to destroy threat missiles, the THAAD can defend a larger area than the older Patriot Air and Missile Defense System. The THAAD will greatly add to Israel‘s already formidable anti-missile defences. The battery will be accompanied by 100 troops. Analysts had warned that it would be a legitimate target. But Iran does not want to get in direct conflict with the USA.
THAAD system vulnerabilities need to be addressed. It must have its camouflage and concealment. Other than the antenna, all parts must be concealed in hardened shelters or underground.
While the export model of Patriot is estimated to cost nearly USD 1 billion, THAAD’s price tag for a single battery is estimated at approximately $2.5 billion. Interestingly, one battery of S-400 had cost India close to a billion dollars. With a huge ballistic missile inventory from China, India needs to have a significant ABM capability and numbers covering large areas of the country. These are crucial for defence and deterrence.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
Twitter: @AirPowerAsia
Like, Share, and Subscribe