Jointness Without Fragmentation
In a PTI interview on 25 October 2026, Chief of Air Staff (CAS) Air Chief Marshal A P Singh emphasised that the “IAF is fully committed to jointness and integration.” He further stated that “future conflicts will be multi-domain by their very nature; three services will operate together far more closely than ever before.” He also opined that the IAF is “not viewing theatreisation as an exercise to permanently divide fighter assets geographically.” That being so, the question that comes to mind is, how can airpower be employed to produce its “greatest effect within an integrated structure?”
Admiral Arun Prakash, former Chief of Naval Staff, opines that the services should “finish arguing” and reach a “settlement” before the next crisis. He also rationalised that the only change will be that “control would shift from an IAF commander to the theatre commander.” A former CDS had opined that the “IAF continues to remain a supporting arm just as artillery support or engineers support the combatant arm in the Army. They will be a supporting arm.”
These statements are representative of the thoughts at the apex level of the three forces. These are mind pictures – the starting point of the planning and execution of war – of the warriors of each domain, the land, sea, and air, respectively, and none of them are wrong. It just represents the lived experience of war that is institutionalised in their respective domain.
Wars Begin in The Mind
It is pertinent to mention that wars are fought in the minds of warriors, much before they are fought on the battlefield. The way military professionals understand war is shaped by their training, experience, operational environment, and the military capabilities they command. An armoured corps commander and an infantry commander may view the same battlefield differently. Both perspectives are valid, but neither alone captures the entire picture.
The same is true of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each service has developed its professional understanding of warfare through its own operational experience, translated into institutional learning. These perspectives are complementary, but they are not interchangeable.
India‘s debate on Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) must recognise this reality. The objective is not to establish the superiority of one service’s perspective over another. It is to develop a command arrangement that brings their strengths together to enhance their total combat power, to achieve national military objectives.
Jointness is essential and is not in question. The question is how best to achieve it.
India’s security environment
India faces a demanding security environment. It must prepare for contingencies involving China and Pakistan, potentially simultaneously, while protecting its maritime interests across the Indian Ocean region. Its military resources are substantial, but they are not unlimited. Modern combat aircraft, airborne surveillance platforms, aerial refuelling aircraft, electronic warfare capabilities, and other specialist enablers are particularly valuable and difficult to replace at short notice.
India must therefore organise its military for the wars it may have to fight, rather than simply reproduce organisational models developed elsewhere. The experiences of the United States and China can give us clues and shape our thoughts. However, their command structures reflect their own geography, military capabilities, strategic priorities, and institutional histories. India‘s solution must emerge from Indian requirements.
The purpose of theatreisation in our case should be to improve the effectiveness of India‘s combat power. A structural reform that improves coordination within individual theatres but unnecessarily restricts the ability to concentrate national capabilities across them would deserve reconsideration.
Jointness does not require uniformity.
There is broad professional agreement that India‘s armed forces need greater integration in joint planning, decision-making, and the conduct of military operations. The services must work towards common objectives, share information, and coordinate their military capabilities. The question is not whether jointness is necessary, but how it should be organised.
Geographically defined theatre commands offer an understandable attraction. A theatre commander responsible for a particular area would have the authority and resources to plan and conduct military operations in that area. This could improve coordination, reduce inter-service friction, and strengthen accountability. However, geographical integration does not automatically produce the most effective employment of every military capability.
Land forces are organised primarily to control and defend territory. Naval forces operate across maritime areas, where the reach and persistence of naval platforms shape their employment. Airpower has different characteristics – it can operate across land and sea, and its effects can extend well beyond the geographical boundaries of the theatre from which it operates.
This difference does not make airpower more important than land or sea power. It means that the military capabilities of the three services cannot always be organised and allocated based on identical principles. Jointness should multiply the effectiveness of India‘s combat power, not institutionalise the fragmentation of a capability whose strength lies in its freedom to act across theatres.
Airpower is Not Merely a Support Arm
Airpower supports land and maritime campaigns, but its role is not confined to supporting other services. It can attack enemy airpower, disrupt logistics, strike important targets, conduct surveillance, and create the conditions in which land forces and naval forces can operate more effectively, besides its own airpower. In suitable circumstances, airpower can independently shape the course of a campaign. Op Sindoor is a classic example, wherein Pakistan was forced to seek cessation of conflict through the military hotline.
In the 1971 war, victory was achieved as our Air Force was able to dominate, starting with a favourable air situation through the continuum to air superiority, during the war in the Eastern sector. This permitted our air and land forces near complete freedom of movement, which shaped the battlefield and the advance of our own troops; even para and heliborne operations were undertaken; 14 Squadron of our Air Force operated from an enemy air base at Jessore, with effect from 14 December 1971; and finally, the surrender of 93,000 fully armed troops. The famous surrender was hastened after pinpoint rocket attacks were carried out by four MiG-21s, followed by another 2 MiG-21s and 2 Hunters, on the Governor’s residence in Dhaka, while an important meeting was in progress on 14 December 1971 (National Archives). Mr A. M. Malik, the Governor of East Pakistan, and his cabinet immediately resigned. As expected, this led to the collapse of the “central nervous system” in East Pakistan.
The Kargil War ended after the air attacks at the enemy camp at Muntho Dhalo, Point 4388, and at Tiger Hill, which led to the surrender of the enemy forces. All this under severe constraints imposed by the government on not crossing the LoC, at high altitude, and with the enemy possessing shoulder-fired missiles.
The concern of the air warriors is not that airpower should operate independently of any joint campaign. It is that its strategic and operational effects should not be reduced to a supporting arm function alone. Airpower has the capability to be employed in support of a theatre commander‘s objectives while simultaneously contributing to wider national military objectives. Its value often lies precisely in its ability to create effects across geographical boundaries.
A force that can be shifted to meet a developing threat, reinforce another front, or exploit an emerging opportunity is a national resource, as was seen during the 1971 war, when several squadrons were shifted from the Eastern sector to the Western sector. Its employment should thus continuously reflect the changing national military priorities of the campaign.
The Real Distinction: Basing and Allocation
A critical distinction in the theatreisation debate is the difference between geographical basing and operational ownership. India‘s combat aircraft are already dispersed across airbases to meet operational requirements. Geographical basing reflects factors such as range, infrastructure, maintenance, readiness, logistics, and response times. An aircraft based in one region may be able to support military operations elsewhere, subject to these practical constraints. Thus, the geographical location of an aircraft does not, by itself, determine who owns it operationally or who decides how it should be employed. The correct question should be whether scarce air assets should be permanently assigned to geographical theatres, or whether their allocation should remain responsive to national military priorities.
These are different propositions. Dispersing aircraft geographically may be necessary for operational effectiveness. Permanently assigning them to three separate theatre commands could, depending on the command arrangements, make it more difficult to concentrate airpower where it is most needed. Consider a major contingency involving China and Pakistan, whether simultaneously or in rapid succession. National military priorities may change as the conflict develops. One front may require additional air effort; another may need reinforcement; a maritime development may demand a different allocation of surveillance, strike, or support assets.
The ability to respond would depend not only on aircraft availability, but also on the allocation of airborne surveillance, aerial refuelling, electronic warfare, and other scarce specialist enablers. These military capabilities cannot be treated as an unlimited pool available independently to every theatre.
The operational question, therefore, is not whether a theatre commander should have the resources and authority needed to conduct a campaign. The commander must have both. It logically is: who determines the allocation of scarce airpower between competing campaigns, and who can adjust that allocation when national military priorities change?
This answer to the above question is that national higher defence management should be involved, not merely by inter-service ownership, under theatreisation.
A National Framework for Airpower
A suggested way forward is to make a distinction between national-level allocation and theatre-level employment.
Rationally, a joint force structure under the Chief of Defence Staff, within the Ministry of Defence, could assess competing operational requirements and allocate airpower according to national military priorities. Professional airpower expertise within this structure would be essential to provide sound advice on the military capabilities required, the operational consequences of allocations, and the risks of committing scarce air assets to one theatre at the expense of another.
Once allocated, those air assets would function under the relevant Integrated Theatre Command to execute its assigned campaign. The allocation could be reviewed and adjusted as the operational situation changes. This approach would preserve the theatre commander‘s authority to plan and conduct military operations while retaining the nation’s ability to concentrate airpower where it matters most.
It would also distinguish joint planning and allocation from the administrative ownership of air assets. The objective would not be to place every operational decision in a central headquarters. It would be to establish a coherent process for deciding national military priorities, allocating military capabilities accordingly, and giving theatre commanders the authority to act.
The precise powers, command relationships, and institutional arrangements required to make this work deserve detailed examination. They should not be assumed to follow automatically from the creation of theatre commands.
Unmanned Systems and Theatre-Level Responsiveness
Unmanned systems offer another opportunity to strengthen theatre-level responsiveness. Depending on their range, payload, endurance, survivability, and level of autonomy, suitable systems can undertake surveillance, reconnaissance, selected strike tasks, and some forms of close air support and battlefield air interdiction. Such military capabilities would give theatre commanders additional means to meet local operational requirements without depending on manned combat aircraft for every task.
This is not an argument that unmanned systems can replace manned airpower. High-threat environments, complex missions, and the need to respond to rapidly changing circumstances will continue to demand a mix of military capabilities. Every unmanned system should not be treated as a substitute for a combat aircraft. Thus, the logical approach is to identify the tasks that can be performed effectively by theatre-controlled unmanned systems; which tasks require manned airpower; and, finally, where nationally allocated air assets should be available to reinforce a theatre when required.
Naval operations should similarly draw primarily on the Navy‘s own aviation and maritime capabilities, including ship-borne helicopters, maritime patrol assets, unmanned systems, and carrier aviation as it develops. Air Force capabilities may augment these where operational circumstances demand, without requiring every capability to be permanently assigned to a maritime theatre.
The principle is straightforward: give theatre commanders appropriate organic capabilities and delegated authority, while preserving national flexibility for scarce air assets whose value extends beyond any one theatre.
Air Defence and The National Air Picture
Air defence (AD) presents a related but distinct challenge. India‘s airspace cannot be treated as a collection of disconnected geographical compartments. Civil aircraft operate throughout the country in peacetime and continue to operate, subject to necessary restrictions and coordination, during conflict. Civil air traffic services, including the relevant Flight Information Centres and associated arrangements, must function alongside military surveillance, identification, and air-defence activities.
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF), together with other surveillance and identification procedures, is vital to distinguishing friendly military aircraft from potential threats. Reliable identification and coordination matter in peace as well as war, although the procedures and operational demands differ. India should be a single theatre for AD.
India therefore needs an integrated national air picture that brings together relevant air activity, surveillance, identification, and air-defence information. ADIZs, FIRs, and military air-defence arrangements serve different purposes and should not be conflated, but the information needed to manage and defend India‘s airspace must be coordinated across their respective boundaries and responsibilities.
The dissemination of this national air picture to the ITCs is equally important. Theatre commanders need timely, relevant information to plan and execute military operations, while the national authority must retain the wider picture required to coordinate air defence and manage competing operational priorities.
This is fundamentally a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) challenge. The architecture must enable information-sharing and interoperability across services and civil-military interfaces, while accounting for security, resilience, and the possibility of disrupted communications.
An integrated national air picture does not mean that every organisation needs to see precisely the same information or exercise identical authority. It means that each receives the information necessary for its responsibilities, within a coherent national framework.
The aim must be unity of the national air-defence effort, with appropriate authority and timely information available to those responsible for execution.
Organise For War, Not the Map
There is no doubt that India needs greater jointness, but jointness should not be confused with just the creation of geographic theatre structures. Also, neither should the creation of geographical theatres be treated as the objective by itself.
The objective is to translate political direction into coherent military objectives and campaigns, allocate national military capabilities according to priorities, and give theatre commanders the authority and means to execute their missions. The command structure should flow from these requirements, not substitute for them.
This requires a distinctly Indian solution, keeping international experience in mind, but shaped by India‘s geography, threat perceptions, available resources, and likely contingencies. It also requires professional debate that moves beyond institutional loyalties to examine the operational consequences of different choices.
Any new arrangement should be introduced carefully, tested against realistic contingencies, and assessed for its effect on readiness, responsiveness, and the ability to concentrate combat power. Reform should strengthen the system without creating avoidable disruption to the forces it is meant to improve.
Airpower must be integrated into joint planning and made responsive to theatre requirements. At the same time, India must preserve its ability to employ scarce air assets across theatres according to national military priorities, supported by an integrated national air-defence and information architecture.
The central question is not whether airpower belongs to the Air Force or should support the Army and Navy. It is how India‘s airpower can best serve the nation.
The test of theatreisation is not how neatly the map is divided, but how effectively India can bring its military power to bear when and where national military objectives demand it.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
Author: Wg Cdr JP Joshi
Twitter: @AirPowerAsia
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