The Military Needs Strategic Thinkers and Not Just Combat Commanders

Airpowerasia, Anil Chopra, The Military Needs Strategic Thinkers and Not Just Combat Commanders

Modern military forces require a blend of tactical excellence and strategic thinking to deter conflict, navigate geopolitical complexity, and translate battlefield strength into lasting political outcomes. Deterrence is beyond combat. Preventing war involves more than operational capabilities. It requires understanding an adversary’s political calculations, regional alliances, domestic pressures, and economic interests. Strategic thinking matters. There is a need to translate power to policy. A recurring flaw in modern warfare is winning tactical engagements while failing to secure enduring national or strategic objectives. To bridge the gap, senior military leaders must communicate complex strategic concepts clearly to the civilian defence and political leadership.

But there are challenges in developing strategists. There is a tactical bias in promotions. Traditional military personnel systems often evaluate and promote officers primarily on tactical and operational competence. Short Professional Military Education (PME) courses struggle to transform operational officers into deep strategists if career paths remain locked into purely tactical command tracks. Modern conflict involves multi-domain warfare spanning cyber, economic, information, and geopolitical realms, demanding interdisciplinary and systems-level problem-solving rather than linear battlefield planning.

What is PME?

Professional Military Education (PME) is a structured system of courses, training, and career experiences designed to prepare military service members—both officers and enlisted personnel—for higher ranks, expanded responsibilities, and complex tactical, operational, or strategic challenges. Intellectual overmatch is required to develop critical thinking, problem-solving, and decision-making skills so military leaders can outthink adversaries and handle disruptive changes.

It acts as a “just-in-time” framework that equips personnel with the necessary military doctrine, management, and leadership skills right before they step into new levels of command. Strategic-level leadership requires teaching commanders how to translate military strength into broader national security goals and communicate effectively with civilian authorities.

Primary or junior-level PME focuses on small-unit leadership, tactical basics, and the foundational roles of junior officers and senior enlisted members. Intermediate-level or Staff Colleges prepare mid-grade officers (such as majors or lieutenant commanders) for staff planning, joint operations, and operational design. Senior Service Colleges and War Colleges focus on senior officers (colonels, generals, and civilian equivalents) studying grand strategy, national security policy, and joint/combined warfighting. This level emphasises integration across different military branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) to ensure seamless multi-domain cooperation.

What Ails PME?

PME suffers from institutional stagnation, a confusion between training and education, and an inability to adapt quickly to modern warfare. While PME is meant to cultivate critical thinking and strategic mastery, critics across major defence establishments, including those in the United States and India, point to several systemic flaws that limit its effectiveness.

Confusing training with education. Training teaches personnel what to think and how to execute standard procedures, whereas education teaches how to think in complex, uncertain environments. Many PME programmes lean heavily on rote memorisation and standard military doctrine rather than fostering independent analytical thought.

Service-specific bias sets in early in the minds of young officers. This happens well before an officer reaches joint training courses like Staff College. You will rarely see an Army officer who doesn’t support theatreisation. You will rarely find an Air Force officer supporting it unconditionally. Each service looks at it from its own biases. Even well after retirement, that objectivity is not always visible.

A “box-checking” culture is often visible. Advancement often depends on merely completing mandatory courses rather than demonstrating intellectual rigour. Students often treat war colleges and staff courses as career milestones or breaks from the operational tempo rather than as demanding academic environments.

Failure to connect operations to strategy. Studies of senior war colleges indicate that students often struggle to link tactical and operational military actions to broader political and strategic policy objectives. One can see curriculum bloat and mission drift. Institutions continually add new non-warfighting topics to their syllabi without removing outdated material. Some critics argue this dilutes focus on the core art and science of warfighting, historical case studies, and wargaming.

There are also institutional and structural challenges. There are talent management and selection imbalance issues. In several militaries, top-performing officers are frequently sent on prestigious command postings or assignments abroad, and the best are not necessarily available as Directing Staff at training institutions, leaving traditional in-residence military staff colleges with a less competitive cohort.

Balancing instruction between uniformed officers and civilian academics, and tailoring courses to meet civilian university accreditation standards, can force military colleges to prioritise academic formalities over practical warfighting rigour. Lack of jointness and academic equivalence is another issue. In systems like the Indian Armed Forces, observers note that PME has historically been overly service-specific and “just-in-time” for immediate tactical roles, lacking deeper integration across services and formal equivalence with civilian higher education degrees.

Curricula often lag behind modern warfare, featuring slow adaptation to emerging technology. Modern conflicts are rapidly reshaped by artificial intelligence, autonomous drones, cyber warfare, and space capabilities. Formal PME curricula often take years to update, leaving officers relying on outdated operational concepts.

To accommodate large numbers of personnel, militaries rely heavily on online and correspondence courses. These programmes frequently lack seminar-style debate and mentorship, reducing education to passive reading and automated testing.

Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on PME

Early this November, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered a sweeping overhaul of military education to refocus on combat lethality. He rolled out a 33-point memorandum and a companion speech at the Naval War College.

https://media.defense.gov/2026/Nov/09/2004025139/-1/-1/1/REFORMING-PROFESSIONAL-MILITARY-EDUCATION-TO-FORGE-WARFIGHTERS-AND-SECURE-VICTORY.PDF

It was a major move to restore a culture of accountability and warfighting excellence and directed the comprehensive overhaul of the Department of Defense’s Professional Military Education (PME) system. Following a rigorous review by the Senior Service College Task Force, the Secretary directed immediate, systemic reforms across all Senior Service Colleges and Intermediate Level Education (ILE) institutions. The directive reverses decades of academic drift, eliminating ideological distractions in favour of joint warfighting mastery, decision-forcing rigour, and competitive wargaming. Under these new guidelines, the Department will evaluate military schools by a singular, uncompromising standard: “Does this programme forge leaders who will win America’s wars?”

The Department’s comprehensive implementation plan lays out immediate directives to restructure how future military commanders are trained and evaluated. “Warfighters in the classroom” establishes elite “Warfighter Chair” positions at all senior colleges, filled by high-performing commanders fresh from operational deployments to inject real-time combat lessons.

Mandatory wargaming and exams replace subjective seminar grading with rigorous, standardised end-of-course wargames and comprehensive exams to test tactical and strategic mastery. It puts in place faculty accountability. It eliminates lifetime tenure and emeritus status for newly hired civilian faculty, shifting instead to three-year, performance-based contracts evaluated on teaching effectiveness and national security research. It introduces rigorous governance oversight and mandates the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to directly track all tasked requirements to guarantee rapid execution.

Secretary Hegseth rightly understands that the PME institutions, especially at the intermediate and senior levels, play a critical role in shaping the strategic culture of U.S. military leadership. He was conscious that the United States has struggled to translate battlefield accomplishments into meaningful political outcomes, which is the true measure of military effectiveness. The ongoing conflict with Iran offers another illustration. American and Israeli forces easily penetrated Iran’s air defences, eliminated its senior leadership, and degraded the country’s missile and naval capabilities. However, nearly nine months after the conflict began, Iran’s governing regime remains in power, the Strait of Hormuz remains too dangerous for commercial shipping, and the Trump administration has failed to translate its immense military advantage into a durable political settlement aligned with U.S. interests.

No one underestimates the U.S. military’s lethality across all domains. But U.S. adversaries almost certainly believe that America’s national security establishment fails to understand the fundamentally political nature of warfare, which dictates that tactical success is necessary but not sufficient to defend and advance U.S. interests in an increasingly contested global security environment.

Sustained deterrence requires understanding adversaries, anticipating their calculations, managing escalation, communicating resolve, and integrating military capabilities with diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power. Preparing military leaders to advise civilian defence officials and contribute meaningfully to whole-of-government decision-making on the most consequential matters of state requires a much broader intellectual foundation than training them merely to carry out operational orders.

Of the genuinely new proposals in the Secretary’s guidance, the most promising include deepening focus on the role of artificial intelligence in modern warfare. There is a requirement to bridge the gap between field-grade operational experience and senior school attendance; better utilising private-sector expertise in PME curricula; and using simulations, table-top exercises, and competitive wargames to evaluate students under conditions that approximate the uncertainty, time pressure, information asymmetries, and competing demands of actual command.

“To be effective, PME institutions require continuity, intellectual independence, and the freedom to challenge prevailing assumptions—including those of the sitting administration. Senior officers must understand and execute civilian policy, but they must also possess the intellectual independence to identify flawed assumptions, offer candid advice, and challenge strategies they believe will fail. That requires an educational environment in which disagreement is encouraged as a mechanism of arriving at better decisions. The measure of a successful PME system is not simply whether it produces officers who can win battles. It is whether it produces strategic leaders who can communicate complex ideas to civilian policymakers, deter our adversaries, and overcome the most consequential shortcoming in the American way of war—translating military strength into enduring national advantage,” writes Greg Pollock, who served in leadership positions in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense from 2010 to 2025.

Why We Need Strategic Thinkers

Modern military organisations require strategic thinkers because the nature of conflict has evolved far beyond physical combat and linear battlefield execution. Translating military power into political goals goes beyond winning individual battles or campaigns. They do not automatically mean achieving national objectives. Strategic thinkers know how to connect military operations with long-term political, economic, and diplomatic outcomes. Today’s threats span multi-domain operations, hybrid warfare, cyber conflicts, and grey-zone competition. Traditional linear planning models cannot account for the unpredictable ripple effects of these modern challenges.

Preventing war, such as deterring blockades or major regional conflicts, requires understanding an adversary’s political psychology, domestic constraints, and economic calculations rather than just matching hardware. Military leaders must clearly articulate complex risks, strategic choices, and resource trade-offs to civilian leadership. Success at the tactical or operational level does not automatically translate to strategic competence. Officers must step back from immediate execution to engage in metacognition, questioning assumptions and designing new institutional paradigms.

Why Study of Military History is Important

Studying military history is vital for armed forces because it builds critical thinking, informs military strategy, and provides a framework to avoid repeating past mistakes. History gives commanders vicarious combat experience, helping them evaluate how tactics, terrain, logistics, and human psychology play out in real-world scenarios, and develop strategic and tactical insight. By analysing past military campaigns, officers learn to ask the right questions, distinguish between superficial correlation and actual causation, and design better operational plans, improving staff planning and decision-making.

It helps prevent strategic blunders. Studying recurring patterns of human behaviour, strategic miscalculations, and political misrepresentations prevents leaders from falling into familiar traps. Adapting military doctrine to context is important. Whether you succeed or fail depends on not applying outdated or mismatched solutions to new threats.

Understanding the nature of war: as military thinkers have noted for millennia, human nature, fear, leadership pressures, and the friction of war remain largely constant even as technology changes.

Can Military Hierarchy Be an Impediment to Strategic Thinking?

Military hierarchy can act as a significant impediment to strategic thinking, though it is simultaneously required for operational execution. Conformity and obedience, and traditional military structures, prioritise discipline, chain-of-command, and adherence to orders. This cultural baseline often rewards risk-aversion and conformity over creative, unconventional, or long-range strategic disruption.

Most of an officer’s career is spent mastering tactical readiness, physical competence, and immediate operational tasks. Transitioning late in a career from executing orders to questioning grand strategy creates a steep institutional gap. Large military establishments and service rivalries can foster careerism, where officers avoid challenging flawed policies or presenting contrarian strategic assessments out of concern for promotion. Top-down command structures can restrict the open, lateral flow of critical feedback from lower echelons to top decision-makers, muting innovative perspectives and pushing personnel into “information silos.”

But hierarchy remains necessary for order execution. The fundamental purpose of the military is organised violence and crisis management, which demands rapid, unambiguous authority, standardisation, and coordination under extreme pressure. Strategy bridges military actions with national policy. A structured command chain ensures that once a political or strategic choice is made by civilian leadership, it can be translated systematically down through operational and tactical levels. The senior officers have to gradually shift to strategic thinking.

Military Leaders Who Gave Firm Advice to Political Leadership

General George C. Marshall (USA), as Army Chief of Staff during and after World War II, advised Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman. He was known for his blunt, honest assessments, lack of personal ambition, and vital role in shaping both wartime strategy and the post-war European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan).

General Dwight D. Eisenhower (USA), as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and later President, Eisenhower excelled at navigating the complex egos of allied politicians (such as Winston Churchill) and military commanders. He championed a collaborative, institutional model of civil-military relations rather than a reckless crusader mindset.

General George Washington (USA), transitioning from military commander to statesman, Washington routinely balanced military necessities with civilian supremacy. He famously rejected temptations toward military dictatorship, establishing the precedent that the armed forces serve and advise constitutional civilian authority rather than rule over it.

Lieutenant General Nathu Singh Rathore (India), during a post-Independence meeting where Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru suggested appointing a British officer as the first Army Chief due to Indian officers’ lack of top-level experience, Rathore boldly pushed back. He famously pointed out that Indian politicians also lacked experience governing a country, yet India did not appoint a British Prime Minister, paving the way for Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa’s appointment.

General K.S. Thimayya (Pre-1962 Sino-Indian Border Tensions), as Chief of the Army Staff from 1957 to 1961, Thimayya repeatedly warned Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon about China’s growing military threat and the Indian Army’s severe shortages in equipment and logistics. Although his warnings were largely ignored at the time due to political friction, his assessments were tragically validated during the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw (1971 Indo-Pak War) is the benchmark for candid military advice in India. In April 1971, when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wanted immediate military intervention in East Pakistan, he famously refused to rush into a premature campaign. He explained to the Cabinet that the army was unequipped, the monsoon was approaching, and Himalayan passes were open to China. Offering his resignation if overruled, he secured the necessary preparation time, resulting in a decisive victory and the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971.

Way Ahead

Want ‘strategic thinkers’? You’ll have to transform the military culture. Some want to blame the war colleges, but really they are just a product of the institution, which fosters the wrong skill sets. I disagree with those who think that even if US military officers were strategic thinkers, it would not matter, as they do not make strategic decisions. Civilian leadership does that for the most part.

Many in the USA seem to feel that at the heart of the repeated operational failures are deeply embedded intellectual failings that reflect inexcusably underdeveloped strategic understanding on the part of America’s current generation of generals and admirals. Most Colonel-ranked officers have at least 15 years of professional experience in operational assignments. They have abbreviated academic experience. But in all this time, they are fully socialised in a hierarchical, authoritarian institution that preaches, extols the virtues of, and lays singular claim to the practice of leadership, but in reality nurtures and rewards dutiful followership.

If we are to confront strategic failings, it is imperative that we accurately diagnose the source of those limitations, avoid uninformed and shallow accusations, and place blame where it properly belongs, which is on the military culture itself. The peacetime generals in world-leading countries usually aren’t that great. Too many people are invested in the status quo to change it. Maybe it is not just a military-specific problem.

Some feel that military leaders are rarely “strategic thinkers”. They are often prisoners of their institutions and training. At best, they are gifted operational-level thinkers. But that does not stop them from trying to engage in “strategic thinking” (especially after they leave the forces). But then many a good operational commander prefers a quiet retirement.

Many civilians are better suited to engage in “strategic thinking”. This is mainly because they are more exposed than their military counterparts to a wider variety of academic training. They are also exposed to a lot more cross-disciplinary literature. But civilians too have problems, and a significant one at that: they often become prisoners of their own biases. These biases are both cultural and intellectual. “Strategic thinking” is also tied closely to global and domestic politics.

Strategic thinkers are usually very well-versed in history, and they are critical thinkers who do not shy away from evaluating and re-evaluating their own premises. They are culturally sensitive; they keep abreast of science, technology, and economics. The “strategist” engages in work that is more policy-centric in form and content.

Strategic thinking is not only about the military. It is also applicable to private enterprises. Strategic thinking, applied judiciously, can bring in “organisational excellence.” At its root is a willingness to challenge the current framework and thought process and explore alternative realities.

Innovation and strategy are often in conflict. Saying, “Aircraft carriers will not be effective in the days of hypersonic missiles and drones; let’s stop building them and dump the $100 billion into rapidly expanding those capabilities,” will be in direct opposition to those who say, “Our current battle-tested carrier groups have worked for 80 years.” That may be an oversimplification. But too much of either type of thinking leads to huge blind spots.

Teaching operational excellence is much easier, as you can identify what already works and find ways to maintain and incrementally improve those best practices. In the end, organisations need to build a culture of pragmatic thinking. Identifying and teaching pragmatic thinking is important.

Strategic planning often spoils strategic thinking, causing managers to confuse real vision with the manipulation of numbers. And this confusion lies at the heart of the issue: the most successful strategies are visions, not plans. It usually takes a strong motivating factor, like a war with a likelihood of losing or an existential threat, to get people to think.

Lastly, the Indian military must encourage reading, critical thinking, and strategic writing. Military structures must promote strategic thinkers and not those who push the commander’s line to show loyalty and gain report points and promotions.

Author: Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)

Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI

Twitter: @AirPowerAsia

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Published by Anil Chopra

I am the founder of Air Power Asia and a retired Air Marshal from the Indian Air Force.

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