PM Narendra Modi just inaugurated the Highway Landing Strip (HLS) for Indian Air Force’s (IAF) aircraft operations in the East on Moran Highway in Assam. Close to the China border, India has turned one more highway into a runway for all types of aircraft in its inventory. The 4.2-km stretch, wrongly termed as just an Emergency Landing Facility (ELF) has been carved out of a National Highway in Dibrugarh district in Upper Assam. It is near IAF’s Chabua airbase, which is the north-easternmost IAF fighter base, and isn’t far from the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. It is strategically sensitive due to proximity with China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, and logistically challenging due to the terrain. The event comes just after IAF operationalized the Nyoma airfield in Ladakh.
Around 16 IAF aircraft, including Rafale and Su-30 MKI fighters, and C-130J Special operation aircraft (flew the PM Narendra Modi) took part in the event. The strip is also fit for the 265 ton (77 ton Payload) C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft. The HLS landing event in Assam was the most elaborate one till date. IAF had earlier operated from HLSs on Greater Noida-Agra Yamuna expressway, the Agra-Lucknow Expressway, NH-925A in Rajasthan (Barmer), and Meerut-Ballia Ganga Expressway.
These strips of highways allow fighter jets and heavy aircraft to land during emergencies or wartime contingencies. They are designed to serve as alternate runways if airbases are targeted or rendered unusable. The IAF and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) have identified around 28 HLS to be developed across India. Approximately 15 facilities are reported as ready or active across various states. The blending of highways and a runway reveals India‘s “strategic resolve”. The HLS will boost national security and disaster preparedness. The airstrip will enhance dispersed and survivable air power in combat scenarios.
Large Airbase Assets
Traditionally the air forces created large airbases with huge infrastructure. This included runways, operational areas, storage hangars, large tarmacs with sun-shelters, maintenance facilities and labs, armament and fuel storage, administrative areas, and housing, among others. Air Forces with global reach had to build these in their territories abroad or in friendly foreign countries. All this cost a lot of money and time to build and operate. When operational requirements reduced after major conflicts, like happened after World War II, most of these airbases had to be abandoned and became disused. Also, after the end of the Cold War, the US Air Force (USAF) greatly reduced its foreign airbases.
In the case of India, the initial airbase locations and other operational infrastructure was Pakistan centric. Later, there was a need to shift focus towards the northern border. This was a major exercise. The global partnerships also keep changing. Having bombed Germany for years in World War II, the West became closer to and made Germany join NATO. USAF has had changing relations with the Philippines, and also with many West Asian countries. Afghanistan is another example where the United States (U.S.) had to vacate after 20 years, and left modern airfields intact. Leaving behind huge infrastructure is a costly proposition and also has operational implications.
Large Permanent Airbases Easy Targets
Satellite-based Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities today allow full details of a permanent airbase. Modern weapons have global strike capability with a high degree of precision and lethality. An airbase is a high-value target. During “Op Sindoor” between 8 and 10 May, India targeted 11 Pakistani airbases, including key air stations at Nur Khan, Jacobabad, and Sargodha. In these attacks, India employed a combination of SCALP and BrahMos missiles.
The best of air defences may not be able to stop all the strike weapons. These can therefore cause considerable damage. For example, Guam is a major USAF airbase in the Pacific, to take on China, and the Americans would have to defend at any cost. Conversely, the Chinese are building their operational inventory to neutralize it. Similarly, some of Indian Airbases, such as Ambala, which is relevant to both Pakistan and China contingencies, are high-value assets. Also, it is not possible to build large airfields in areas where the conflict starts after a trigger event. In such a case one has to depend on regional partners’ assets, as the U.S. did during operations against Iraq by using Saudi airbases like Dhahran. This too may not always be possible because of local political sensitivities.
Agile Air Operations Concept
The ability to project power cannot be compromised. Major air forces of the world, especially those that have to plan for out-of-area contingencies, have thus begun evolving a new concept where self-contained mobile air force units are created which will use specially designed highway stretches as operating surfaces. Such a concept has existed in the IAF mainly to take over enemy or disused airfields during contingencies. The highway stretches exist in most major countries, including in India. A forward arming and refuelling point (FARP) or forward area refuelling point is an existing NATO term for an area where aircraft (typically helicopters) can be refuelled and re-armed at a distance closer to their area of operations than their main operating base. This was also used for Harrier vertical Take-off jet operations. The concept at a bigger scale is now being applied to fighter operations.
The USAF has formalized, and introduced the Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which is a proactive scheme for agile air power projection at short notice. The concept requires identification of road/highway stretches that have been prepared for possible air operations. These stretches are duly marked for air operations. There are no access roads crossing these stretches. Small aircraft parking and servicing aprons are created at either or both ends. Such aprons would be suitably camouflaged and may have forest like surroundings. The Command and Control (C2) will be through minimal secure satellite mobile communications. Each launch pad will have man-portable AD systems. It will have an element of counter drone capability.
A mobile servicing cum replenishing unit is especially designed for the purpose. This includes vehicles for Fuel, Oils, and Lubricants (FOL), and dedicated armament carrying and loading vehicles. Normally, their requirement will be to only service around four aircraft at a time. There will be a universal power generation unit for both lighting and powering the aircraft. The storage and replenishment point for these vehicles could be a ubiquitous warehouse in the neighbourhood. It will require minimal manpower. In case of a major technical problem on the aircraft, the modern fault diagnostic system will transmit information to the major repair base which could be a few 100 kilometres away. A crack team of specialists would be heli-lifted for further repairs.
Modern fifth-generation aircraft that require conformal carriage would have limitation on quantum of on-board fuel. They would invariably require aerial refuelling. With very long range aerial missiles, the Flight Refuelling Aircraft (FRA) will be forced to maintain farther from the frontline. The ACE concept will be advantageous in that context too.
Leveraging local commercial markets can alleviate distribution system stress. It can thus be seen that infrastructure requirements are minimal. A cluster of launch pads or contingency locations can be fed by a central logistics and maintenance support centre, like a hub-and-spoke set up. Such launch and recovery pads can be built in larger numbers, often at short notice. ACE offers great flexibility. ACE will work well, especially since in a contested environment, air-superiority may not be easy to achieve.
Complicate Enemy Targeting
The ACE will certainly complicate the enemy’s targeting process, and create operational dilemmas for the adversary. The system will be highly mobile. After forward objectives are achieved the launch pad can be deactivated. In case of advancing forces, fresh pads can be created ahead. All launch pad relocations will be like a proactive manoeuvre, and alter adversary or enemy understanding of friendly intentions and capabilities. It will be an aggressive use of mobility and dispersion of forces and assets. ACE positions the force for observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop in all domains. It will increase survivability and support reposition forces for follow-on operations. It will also complicate adversary’s Anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. It will create dilemma and complicate adversary’s operational response and tempo. This will make targeting by adversary much more complex and put premium on timely intelligence.
India’s Highway Landing Strips
All the new expressways being built in the country have 3-kilometre or longer straight stretches for IAF aircraft to be able to operate. The stretches have approach paths clear from obstacles as per specifications. The stretches have runway markings exactly as are at IAF airfields. The side berms have been kept clear of obstructions. The highway pole lights have been replaced with ground lighting to cater for aircraft operations. At the ends of these highway runway stretches is a larger area for the aircraft to be able to turn around. Securing these strips and the IAF assets is being managed by the IAF in close coordination with civil police or even para-military agencies. IAF has been carrying out landings and take-off operations from most of these stretches.
Such highway strips are created for use in emergencies and war like situation which may render air force bases inaccessible due to bombing or other calamities like earthquake as happened in Bhuj in January 2001. The Indian government has realized the operational importance of these strips and are now accelerating the process to build many more such strips. Various government departments could now explore the possibility of greater civil use during calamities.
As of late 2025, India has 44 operational expressways, with a rapidly expanding network exceeding 6,000 km in total length and over 11,000 km under construction, and many more under planning. Most expressways are fit for fighter jet operations. The expressways connecting Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Haryana, U.P., Bihar, West Bengal, North eastern states, Rajasthan and Gujarat have immediate operational significance due proximity to borders. Expressways in southern states are important as India shifts to greater Indian Ocean focus. The concept is interesting for the IAF to implement, and it will greatly increase freedom of action for the IAF.
IAF Preparation for Operationally Limiting Environment
Each major airbase should initially be given a few expressway stretches to manage and build ACE-related support infrastructure and logistics support. Tailorable force packages would have to be evolved. It will require rapidly establishing short-duration air traffic services (ATS) under austere conditions for both rotary-wing and fixed-wing assets on an expeditionary basis for missions of short duration and limited scope. Quick Reaction Teams (QRT) would have to be created. The aircrew would have to regularly train to land and operate from such locations. The mission may not land back at the same launch pad, and be retrieved at a far-off place, giving operational flexibility.
Air warriors would have to be trained for skills to operate in a contested, degraded, and operationally limited environment, to execute distributed operations that increase survivability while generating combat power. They will have to operate with minimal equipment and personnel footprints. Operating area Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) will have to be evolved. These would list equipment and supply pre-positioning, scalable logistics packages, and resupply sources.
IAF already operates in a networked environment. Secure satellite data-links will be used to feed relevant operational mission information, including situational awareness and operational priorities. It will make IAF operations light, lean and agile. IAF will be able to redistribute posture through operational unpredictability afforded by an increased number of dispersed locations. Location shifts could mean command and control shift, and the SOPs for flexibility would have to be worked out. ACE will require multi-tasking air warriors to accomplish tasks outside of their core air force specialty. This is a concept well in place in most modern air forces. This would have to strengthen in IAF too.
Leveraging advances in artificial intelligence, automation, and augmentation and human-machine teaming would make operations smoother and effective, and increase ability of commanders to rapidly develop, execute, or transition between missions. Dispersal plans from specific permanent airbases would have to be put in the operational contingency plans. Only a few launch pads, among the many, will be occupied at any given time, and these will be in the active war theatres. Lastly, the QRTs will also be used for outside area contingencies, especially when landing at semi-prepared surfaces as the IAF landed the C-130 in Wadi Sayyidna, Sudan, during Operation ‘Kaveri’.
Options and Way Ahead India
The concept is a revolutionary change in how the air forces think about and conduct operations. It is a forward-looking concept with greater flexibility and “punch for the buck”. It is both for offensive and defensive operational approaches, especially in contested environments. This will enable quicker and more effective offensive operations following the adversary’s initiation of conflict. It enables dispersed forces to adapt and prevail despite uncertainty. Closer to the Tactical Battlefield Area (TBA), such operations can be supported or secured by the Indian Army. If similar concept had been applied by Ukraine, a significant part of its air force would still have been operational.
The large adversary like China wields a disruptive and dangerous operational reach with mass, precision, and speed. They can challenge India’s ability to project power from large airfields by targeting them. The concept will mitigate the adversary’s technological advancements in ISR and its advantage in long-range strike, and reduce risk to own airbases and assets. It will adjust to a changing operational environment and the evolving character and phase of war. The ACE concept shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that are operationally viable. ACE concept’s potential will be maximized in a highly lethal, hyperactive battlefield. The operating stretch of the expressway may be changed on an as-required basis. IAF may run a few pilot projects to begin with. Thereafter, there will be need to train to make the air force more flexible and agile. The scheme should also work very well in some advanced landing grounds in Ladakh and India’s North East. This could also work well on Island territories. Out-of-the-box thinking often finds operationally good and viable solutions. Let us stop using defensive names such as “Emergency Landing Strips”, and call them “Advanced Operating Airstrips” (AOS).
Note: The article was originally written by the Author for The Eurasian Times 19th February 2026; it has since been updated.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
Twitter: @AirPowerAsia