Future of Air Dominance – Lessons From Recent Conflict

The India-Pakistan air conflict during Operation Sindoor and the long ongoing conflict in Ukraine, reinforced the crucial role of air power and air dominance in modern warfare. Air superiority allows freedom of maneuver in all domains and coordinated attacks. It also gives freedom for logistical support for ground and naval forces. The ability to deny the enemy air space remained a key factor in winning battles. Air Superiority, while essential for decisive victory, may not be possible between Peer adversaries. The conflict in Ukraine demonstrated that a lack of air dominance led to limited or slow success. Drones have become a significant factor in modern warfare, disrupting traditional air superiority concepts and requiring new defensive strategies. Some argue that air denial, which focuses on preventing the enemy from using the airspace, vis-à-vis air superiority, might be a more sustainable strategy in the long run, especially in contested areas. Studying and evolving technologies, aerospace battle scenarios of the future, tailoring doctrines and conceptualizing aerial platforms and weapons are continuous processes of modern leading air forces. In its quest to dominate the air battlefield of the future, the US Air Force (USAF) looked to replace the traditional fighter jet with a network of integrated systems disaggregated across multiple platforms. There is a need to develop technology to deter current and emerging threats and to produce the non-linear, game-changing combat capabilities. Russia, and especially China, attempted to close the capability gap with the United States, by building long-range missiles, anti-satellite and anti-aircraft weapons to foil US forces’ ability to penetrate. It meant increased dependence on space and cyber. The World explored hypersonic and directed energy weapons, autonomous operations, and electronic attack. In its “Next Generation Air Dominance” USAF worked to find the most effective combination of speed and maneuverability, payload, and range for the new platforms, and the right level of stealth, or low-observability. Effective air operations finally depended on well-defined doctrine, robust training, and standardized procedures. 

Air Supremacy in the Past

Air power has been a powerful element, and has been a dominant one in recent military campaigns. Air supremacy allows increased long-range strike efforts, tactical air support for ground forces, paratroop assaults, cargo operations, and airdrops. The degree of air control is a zero-sum game, increasing control by one corresponds to decreasing control by the other. Korea and Vietnam saw that despite overwhelming superior force, it was not possible to achieve air supremacy in the conventional sense against a determined enemy. The two Arab-Israeli wars and the Bekka Valley operations saw huge influence of air supremacy. Iraq and Afghanistan wars saw a highly uncontested environment and lessons may be unrealistic. The air strike had once moved from high altitude bombing to ultra-low levels, and once again moved to high altitude with stealth platforms. Aerial missiles and ground based AD systems continue to restrict air supremacy capability. Cheaper man-portable missile AD systems (MANPADS) have had their dynamics and are not easy to find and neutralize. India learnt the hard way during initial days of air operations in Kargil when it lost a helicopter to a MANPAD, albeit it was not carrying IR flares. Indian Air Force (IAF) was forced to conduct high altitude strikes. Also further evolution of electronic warfare and directed energy weapons makes things complex.  The world has been forced to expensive long-range precision strike, albeit, less expensive than losing a platform.To what extent can air superiority be achieved and at what cost remains the question. 

Air Dominance in Peer Fight

Achieving significant air dominance of the skies in a near-peer fight has its own dynamics.For long, after the Korea War, there have been few recent cases of peer-capability conflicts. While Russia had near 12:1 air superiority but with Western support to Ukraine, the differential had greatly reduced. In Op Sindoor India reportedly engaged only with forces on its Western border creating a somewhat peer situation, albeit IAF remained more powerful. Air supremacy can best be achieved in time and space, and synchronized with other operations. As some call them “windows of dominance”.Air Forces need to prioritize development of the capabilities needed to conduct counter anti-access/area denial strategies.The nature of the airspace has become more complex and crowded, and complete freedom of action may no longer be achievable to anyone.Success lies in the ability to adapt and manage and play with adversary strengths and weaknesses. Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)

SEAD remains very important and must lead any air campaign. Targeting adversary fixed air defence assets and destroying during the first hours of a conflict will be a priority. One good example was the Bekaa valley SEAD operation by Israel in 1982. IAF’s air strike on the crucial Pakistani HQ-9 air defence system near Lahore, and many others, before IAF launched massive strikes on military targets across Pakistan in Op Sindoor is another good example. Ground-based air defence proved extremely lethal, as seen in the Ukraine conflict. Challenges of contemporary integrated air defence systems are significant.Emerging AI, cyber, and electronic warfare technologies, require innovative SEAD approach. Saturation of air space using decoys, drone swarms and electronic warfare (EW) will be important. Manned Unmanned Teaming will create newer options. High accuracy and large warhead Loitering Munitions (LM) would play a great role. It will also require “magazine depth” to conduct such operations at scale. 

Air Defence

Layered and cost-effective air defence are necessary, more so with the proliferation of aerial threats. Air defence has to cater for threats across the spectrum, from small drones, drone swarms, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, aircraft, and even satellites. Some of these could be at very high speed, including hypersonic and have ranges as 2,000 kilometres as in the case of the Russian Kinzhal ballistic missile. Air defence could be by ground-based, sea-based or airborne aircraft. Multi-layered air defence systems, which include both fixed and mobile systems, as well as electronic warfare capabilities are required. Advanced technologies are increasingly important in modern air warfare. AI-enabled systems can track and neutralize large numbers of autonomous aerial threats. India saw that integrating indigenous technologies into air defence systems can significantly enhance a nation’s ability to secure its airspace and deter adversaries. Whether it was the IAF’s automated Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), the Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) developed Akashteer Air Defence Control & Reporting System for Indian Army, and the DRDO‘s D4 (Drone, Detect, Deter, Destroy) comprehensive counter-UAS solution. Indigenous Akash AD system along with the formidable S-400 AD system were a great asset. 

Air Denial

Despite huge asymmetry, Ukraine was able to deny the larger and technologically superior Russian Air Forces any level of air superiority through “air denial”. Effectively restricting unhindered use of Russian offensive air power, and in turn slowing the surface offensive. Russian manned aircraft have not flown even close to the border for some time now. Of course Ukraine was backed by a huge supply of Western air defence systems to add to the existing Soviet-era S-300s in its inventory. They also have the “home-court” advantage, as they have to concentrate mostly on their own defence. Many analysts have blamed the Russians for the poorly run SEAD campaign, and called it a self-inflicted failure. While that may be partially true, the same may not have been easy against some of the AD systems. Mobile AD systems that “shoot-and-scoot” have worked well in Ukraine. Their radar comes on for a very short time, and then they quickly shift location, making SEAD difficult. Cyber interferences, electromagnetic jamming, cheap but effective over-lapping air defences, and larger stocking of missiles make air denial effective. Aircraft are “no more just the hunter but also the hunted.” Modern AD weapons like the S-400 cover the entire vertical and horizontal bubble. Denying the expensive fighters and bombers the ability to come into the tactical battle zone has its dynamics. Close counter surface force operations by fighters and attack helicopters have become highly risky.  Even though targets have to be hit by long-range weapons and cruise missiles,the airborne combat platforms will be required to launch them for targeting flexibility and longer range.
Op Sindoor has also taught us that mutually denied air environments are likely to become the new status quo. Fighter aircraft of either side may not be able to cross over or come close to adversary air defences. With long range aerial missiles and SAMs it could mean over a few hundred kilometres. It will mean increased inventories of S-400 class SAMs, and very long range aerial missiles. All these are expensive. The country with a stronger economy will be able to sustain and dominate. 

Long Range Precision Strikes

Air is the fastest and preferred medium for long-range precision strikes. Quick reaction time, high precision, stealth, and lethality made them preferred weapons in Ukraine, West Asia and Op Sindoor. Hypersonic weapons in Ukraine, supersonic BrahMos, and long range Scalp missiles dominated. Jet powered LMs like Harop played a great strike role. Ground-based indigenous Skystrikers were relatively cheaper but very accurate. The American MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), supersonic tactical ballistic missiles with 300 kilometres range proved effective in Ukraine. It can be seen that air power had to do the heavy lifting in most of the recent conflicts including Op Sindoor. Russia managed to damage or destroy 75 percent of Ukraine’s fixed air defence assets at the very beginning of the 2022 offensive, by just using precision fires and deep air strikes. In the three day conflict, IAF managed to hit significant Pakistani AD assets through precision strikes, and then carried out deep strikes on terror and military targets across the length and depth of Pakistan without any weapon getting neutralized. There will be a need for large inventories. They will be costly. Indigenous systems would be highly preferred to achieve short notice “surge” production. Secure import supply lines would also be required for long drawn conflict. For both precision strikes and air defence to succeed there will be a need for offensive electronic warfare support. 

Situational Awareness and Information Dominance

Acquiring situational awareness of the 3-dimensional battle space is very important. Situational awareness is provided by a truly integrated system-of-systems.This requires secure networking of all sensors such as ground-based, sea-based, and aerial radars, satellite and other sensors. The fused situation picture has to be available to the commanders and all operators on as required basis. Effort has to be made to deny the same to the adversary through jamming sensors and compromising networks through cyber-attacks. Having capability to intrude into adversary networks would bring in information dominance. Situational will mean survivability. The offensive electronic warfare capabilities will be very relevant. 

AI for Decisive Solutions

New Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools quickly fuse data from multiple air-defence sensors and could transform how militaries defend against emerging aerial threats such as hypersonic missiles and drone swarms. AI will greatly support faster decision making. It will categorise  threat levels, and help in target to weapon matching. Advances in technology have also resulted in a wider range of data coming from radar, satellites, or drones. The challenge is to collect all of that data, even in places where adversaries will be trying to jam communications, quickly analyze and integrate it, and send it back to give the operators on the ground enough time to take action. AI will also support choosing from all the available communication paths to transfer the data to the front lines. 

Fusion and Cooperative Attacks

For long, the concept of data-link sensors being used for cooperative attacks has been tried and tested. A formation of MiG-31 with a large long range radar could cover a large front of around 1,000 kilometres. It would be data-linked with many MiG-29s who would remain radar-silent and actually fire the missiles, thus managing electronic surprise. In modern days there are additional sensors like satellites, AEW&C platforms data-linked, creating a situation where the target could be tracked by AEW&C or even a low earth orbit satellite, the fighter firing the missile would be radar-silent, the missile could be updated enroute through an independent data link, and finally it could make its own radar live only at a very close range or “No Escape Zone” to the target. This would give little time for the target aircraft to evade.

Limits of Attack Helicopters

Ukraine conflict has brought out that in a dense AD environment, the attack helicopters could be very vulnerable to ground air defences. The US Army has decided to cancel its next generation, multi-billion dollar, Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program. They also plan to end production of the UH-60 V Black Hawk by 2025. Ukraine not only saw attack helicopters getting shot up, both sides lost 50 fighter aircraft each within the very first month of the conflict. 

Uninhabited Aerial Systems (UAS) in Contested Environment

Uninhabited aircraft technologies are already proven, and the future is uninhabited platforms. The world is in transition. Solar-powered UAS are already flying in near space. Dual use (optionally manned) aircraft are also flying. UCAVs and large loitering munitions like Harop are battle proven. UAS are taking-off and landing by themselves including on the moving aircraft carrier (Northrop Grumman X-47B). Autonomous air refueling has been tested. USA is also working on Hypersonic (Mach 6) Strike Bomber that would be optionally manned. Drone convoys are delivering supplies to troops at combat front lines. Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) sees great future. Mass air raids with a drone swarm leading the manned aircraft strikes has already been tested. Jet-powered kamikaze drones with significant warheads will make a great strike weapon. But a large number of expensive MQ-9 Predator drones have been neutralized with little effort in Black Sea and also in the Red Sea during the ongoing conflicts. These subsonic reconnaissance or combat drones are very easy targets for both ground-based and aerial air defences. Today they are relevant only for peacetime surveillance. Some of these roles can be done by low earth orbit (LEO) satellite constellations with much greater persistence. The US Air Force (USAF) has told the US Congress that they do not wish to invest in these anymore because they will be of little use in a contested environment. 

Risk to High Value Assets

The sinking of large cruiser “Moskva” by sea-skimming cruise missiles was another indication that large expensive platforms have to remain farther away from defences. Large high-value ISR, AEW&C, and FRA platforms, can be forced further away by longer range ground AD weapons and modern aerial missiles. In Op Sindoor, by and large these assets were kept at safe distances, but there are reports that one Pakistani AEW&C was destroyed by The  Indian AD action.

Future Air Dominance Fighters

World has analyzed over 1,450 air-to-air engagements since 1965 and found that long-range weapons and sensors have dramatically decreased instances of dog-fighting. With the increasing air defence systems using electronic and infrared sensors and high-speed weapons, traditional designs relying on small size, high speed, and maneuverability have become less relevant. Larger fighters could rely on enhanced sensors, signature control, networked situational awareness, and very-long-range weapons to complete engagements before being detected or tracked. Larger planes would have greater range that would enable them to be stationed further from a combat zone, have greater radar and IR detection capabilities, and carry bigger and longer-range missiles. The USA has chosen the Boeing F-47 NGAD fighter. It is conscious of the contested environment against peer competitors Russia and China. NGAD is an aircraft that is meant to combine various systems, such as MUM-T cyber, and electronic components. Well beyond traditional positioning, navigation, targeting, communication and ISR support, space based asset links,it would include directed energy weapons (DEW) and strong electronic warfare capabilities. The cost of a modern fifth-generation fighter is around $100 million.  The NGAD would be highly cost-intensive with state-of-the-art avionics and weapons. Only a few may afford it. They may get neutralized by much cheaper systems. The world needs to find cheaper force-multiplier solutions. Yet the Russian, Indian, Turkish and other fifth-generation aircraft, and Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) and Future Combat Air System (FCAS), and the Chinese sixth-generation aircraft are attracting funding. 

Weapons of the Future

Future weaponry would utilize scramjets for the production of faster missiles, a speed at which a missile could not be stopped by conventional air defence technology. Continued experiments with DEW and lasers, used for defensive as well as offensive measures, delivering effects at the speed of light, are also likely to shape the battlefield. Reusable weaponry (lasers) will allow an ending magazine. New air-to-air missile, would promise an improved solid rocket motor having synergized control enabled by thrust vectoring. The missiles will have improved ‘high off bore-sight’ for rear hemisphere kills and “lower cost-per-kill.”Survivable, future long-range missiles with combined air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities are being evolved. Multiband, broad spectrum missiles will be more survivable. No aircraft is invisible, and using standoff weaponry early in an air campaign to open up weaknesses in an enemy’s air defence will be required even for 5th generation fighter aircraft to operate in the area without assuming excess risk. Development of solid-state airborne laser capability can create a sanitized sphere of safety around the aircraft, by shooting down or critically damaging incoming missiles and approaching aircraft. 

Evolving Other Technologies

For long time, military aviation doctrines and requirements drove technology. Today technologies are offering enhanced capabilities that are driving operational employment and tactics. Artificial Intelligence (AI), smart structures, and hybrid systems will dictate the future. Demand for streaming high-quality data requires bandwidth, which involves innovating sensor/processing systems. Mission computer systems and network-centric payload processing units enable thermally-efficient on-board data fusion prior to sending to digital links. Next-generation avionics would be smaller, more efficient and capable of operating under extreme conditions. Any system must be designed with aim for maintaining a competitive advantage in an austere budget environment. Uniquely designed composite wings will be lighter, more structurally efficient and have flexibility compared to conventional wings. Hypersonic cruise, fuel cell technologies, hybrid sensors, improved human-machine interface using data analytics and bio-mimicry, combination of materials, apertures and radio frequencies that ensure survival in enemy territory are under development. Things will be built faster, better and more affordably, using 3D printing yet ensuring quality and safety standards. Additive 3D manufacture creates a world with spare parts on demand, faster maintenance and repairs, more effective electronics, and customized weapons. The development of a hypersonic aircraft would forever change the ability to respond to conflict. 

Air and Space as Continuum Domain

With “Near Space” seeing greater action, the thin line dividing air and space has disappeared.  Aerospace craft routinely transit the two mediums. The tactical appreciation and combat engagements in the two domains will be similar. Most major countries like the USA, France, UK and Russia have merged or put the space forces under Air Element. There will now be a need to aim to seize control establishing dominance/supremacy over the enemy’s aerospace assets. Space is supporting continuous early warning and ISR, and secure communications for command and control. Space already supports Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT). This will be further enhanced by Artificial intelligence (AI). Satellite/aircraft based kinetic and directed energy weapons will soon be a reality and will be used for aerial or surface attack. A technology-led “degree of dominance” in the air-space bubble will be advantageous. 

To Summarise

Air superiority is undoubtedly desirable, but becoming increasingly restricted. There will always be a need for out-of-the-box thinking. There will always be a need for Plan-B.  Be prepared for contested airspace. One has to find means to deny the adversary exploitation of the air domain, by employing long-range fires, and intercepting enemy strikes. Technology will harness solutions. India has to face two powerful militaries with peer or better capabilities. While India must retain and strengthen offensive capability to hit hard and far, India too must prepare for the air-denial regime and scenario. It may be a smarter, more economical choice. India needs to build stronger air defences with high stock levels of missiles. In critical areas there will be a need for high density of AD systems. Modern electronic warfare capabilities that are constantly upgraded will be required. Secure jam-resistant communications will be critical. India must increasingly exploit space as a platform cum force multiplier.
There is a need to master drone and swarm employment, and build inventories. Larger inventories are also required for supply chain disruptions. Meanwhile India has to accelerate home grown design and production of drones. Iran and Turkey have been great examples of this, and their systems have been extensively used in the recent conflicts. Drones have to cover the full spectrum from very small to mid-sized and stealthyUCAVs with stand-off weapons. Manned Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) is the future. Drones with greater range and autonomy would be a good investment. Precision strikes may be accompanied by drone swarms. Stealthy fighter bombers as a platform are still here to stay.It takes a long time to develop them. That process must carry-on.  More and more of these will become uninhabited, or optionally manned. There will be dramatic changes in the aerial platform performance and aerial weapons. Aerospace will soon become a common domain and need to be exploited together. Combat engagements will be at much faster speeds and much greater distances.Fighters must have long-range precision strike weapons. Their physical entry into highly contested areas will have to be dynamic. We have seen counters to drones and drone swarms already evolving and used in conflict. The Indian integrated counter drone grid proved very successful in Op Indoor. Lastly, there is a need to hasten slowly. War lessons are ever evolving. Identify cheaper, yet effective, priority areas and fund appropriately. While we must constantly assess adversary strength and threat to match numbers and capabilities, for me, stealth fighters, Space, MUMT, cyber, proliferation of AD systems, electronic warfare, and weapon stocking are priority areas.

Note: The article was originally written by the Author for Defstrart on 3rd June 2025; it has since been updated.

Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI

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