The Kargil War was fought between India and Pakistan in the high mountains in the Kargil District of Jammu and Kashmir, and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LoC) between 3 May and 26 July 1999. Code-named ‘Operation Vijay’, it ended with a decisive victory for Indian forces, and India regained possession of territory occupied by Pakistani intruders. Nearly 500 Indian soldiers were killed in action, whereas Pakistan lost over 700 soldiers, whom it initially kept claiming as Kashmiri insurgents. This war was one of the most recent examples of high-altitude warfare. It was also the first direct conventional war between two nuclear states. The high mountains posed great operational and logistical challenges. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was first approached to provide air support on 11 May 1999 with the use of helicopters. However, the then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) insisted, and a go-ahead was given on 25 May by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) for the IAF to mount unrestricted attacks on the infiltrators without crossing the LoC. The full-scale air operations that began on 26 May were codenamed ‘Operation Safed Sagar’. After a few initial aircraft losses, the IAF had to revisit its employment philosophy and commenced high-altitude bombing using precision weapons. Successful strikes by Mirage 2000 aircraft with Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) not only helped turn the tide of the war and hastened the recapture of high mountain peaks but also greatly reduced Indian Army casualties.
Kargil was the highest battlefield ever in the world, with outposts on the ridges generally around 5,000 m (16,000 ft) high, and a few going up to as high as 5,485 m (18,000 ft). While the Indian Army had an uphill task to evict the intruders, the IAF had never practised weapon delivery at these altitudes. No aircraft in the world had been designed to operate in a Kargil-like environment. There is a severe degradation of aircraft and weapon performance at these altitudes. Due to the rarefied atmosphere, weapons do not perform as per sea-level specifications. Variations in air temperature and density alter drag indices and a host of other factors (never computed by any manufacturer for this type of altitude), causing weapons to go off their mark. Many assessments of the air war in Kargil have been carried out. Notwithstanding the eventual success, there were hits and misses, and the IAF had its lessons to learn. The IAF had to review its tactics, choice of weapons employed, weapon delivery techniques, and even technical specifications for future acquisitions of various aerial platforms and weapons. Twenty years after the Kargil War, it is time to take stock and see if all lessons have been imbibed and amends made to fight a future air war with greater finesse and accuracy.
Major Lessons from the Ground War
Many lessons were learnt by the Indian Army from the Kargil War. These included the failure to monitor intrusion—highlighting the need for better intelligence and reconnaissance. The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons. Many posts were also heavily mined. This happened undetected. The vulnerability of NH1 at some points close to the LoC highlighted the need for alternative and wider roads. More modern logistics support was needed in the mountains. Pakistan had carried out reconnaissance using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). India had to build up a UAV force. The Indian Army had to bring in about 250 artillery guns to target the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role. Artillery was very effective. Since daylight attacks could be suicidal, all advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, withstanding a high wind chill factor and the risk of freezing. The Indian Army launched its final attacks in coordination with relentless attacks by the IAF, both by day and night, and it greatly reduced casualties. It was clear that India required greater preparation for high-altitude war.
Operation Safed Sagar – Initial Losses
The IAF began electronic intelligence (ELINT), photo, and aerial reconnaissance in early May. On 21 May, a Canberra PR57 on a reconnaissance mission was hit by a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. The plane returned on one engine and landed safely. Air strikes on enemy positions began on 26 May. Ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars, and helicopter gunships were employed initially and struck insurgent positions. Initially, the effectiveness was limited. The MiG-21 was built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack. The IAF‘s ageing fleet of MiG-21s and MiG-27s operated without modern navigation equipment, and pilots strapped GPS gadgets to their thighs or held them in hand. 1,000-kg ‘dumb’ bombs were dropped at Army-designated bomb impact points, which would snowball into landslides or avalanches. The aim was to cut off Pakistani transit lines to such an extent that even the wounded could not be evacuated. On 27 May 1999, the IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft piloted by Flt Lt Nachiketa, which was attributed to an engine failure caused by a disturbance of airflow at the engine air inlet during high-altitude rocket firing. Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, who was escorting Nachiketa in a MiG-21, tried to trace the downed MiG-27 despite the potent threat in the form of enemy surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and his plane was shot down by a Stinger shoulder-fired missile in the Batalik sector. It is believed that he survived the crash but was tortured and killed by Pakistani soldiers. The following day, a Mi-17 was shot down with the loss of all four crew when it was hit by three Stinger missiles while on an offensive sortie in the Tololing sector. The aircraft did not have a serviceable IR flare dispenser. These losses forced the IAF to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles.
Mirage 2000H and LGBs
At this stage, the IAF decided to induct the Mirage 2000H and to begin high-altitude bombing using LGBs with high accuracy to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces. The first Mirage 2000 mission was launched on 30 May. Armed initially with Spanish 250-kg ‘dumb’ iron bombs, No. 7 Squadron struck for three days at infiltrator positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill, and Point 4388 in the Dras Sector. As the war progressed, the IAF aircrew had to modify aiming indices and firing techniques, increasing their effectiveness in high-altitude weapon delivery. There was no opposition by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), leaving the IAF free to carry out its attacks with impunity; however, IAF aircrew could not ignore the presence of PAF fighters operating regularly within Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Also, the restriction of not crossing the LoC put limitations on choices of attack directions for the fighter aircrew.
The French Atlis II laser designation pod (LDP) and 1,000-kg LGBs which came to India with the Mirage 2000 were not suited for targets in the Kargil sector. They were ideally suited for targeting Command and Control and recessed sites requiring deep penetration. The IAF had a number of the much cheaper US Paveway II LGBs for use with the Israeli Lightning LDPs, but certain parts of the Paveway kit were not available as they were placed under embargo by the US as a consequence of the nuclear tests performed by India. Consequently, the IAF had to modify and manufacture these parts in order to make the Paveway serviceable for use. Also, the Lightning pods required manual alteration as they were unknown to the Mirage computer. Fuzes were not available for the 1,000-lb bombs, so pistol fuzes were modified and proved effective. Wing pylon clearance for carrying old 1,000-lb bombs was done at Gwalior, the Mirage 2000 home base.
Interestingly, only nine LGBs were used in this war: eight by the Mirage and one by a Jaguar. The dumb bombs also proved highly effective. The first IAF LGB mission was carried out on 24 June and destroyed the Pakistani command and control bunkers on Tiger Hill. The first night LGB mission was flown with a time over target (Tiger Hill) of 0230 IST on 28 June. Achieving a direct hit as reported by the Army, this mission was considered instrumental in paving the way for ground forces to capture Tiger Hill. The Pakistani primary supply depot at Muntho Dhalo in the Batalik sector and the large logistics camp at Point 4388 in Mashkoh Nallah were destroyed by Mirage 2000 bombing.
Operational Air Summary
After initial mishaps, all aircraft operated at an altitude of 10,000 metres (33,000 feet above sea level), diving when required and pulling out well out of Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) range. The lesser number of airstrips in the Kashmir region constrained the revisit time of the attacks. Yet hundreds of attack sorties were flown, enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian Army troops. As per the Ministry of Defence (MoD) annual report, a total of 7,831 sorties were flown by the IAF: 1,730 by fighters (22.7%), 3,427 by transport aircraft (44.9%), and 2,474 by helicopters (32.4%). Nearly 48% of fighter sorties were for strike missions. Another 39% were for Air Defence Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and escort missions. Nearly 13% were for reconnaissance missions.
Wake-up Call for the IAF
The Kargil conflict came as a wake-up call for the IAF to upgrade the ageing fleet of aircraft for better mountain air operations. The IAF acquired and later co-developed the Sukhoi Su-30MKI large fighters with Russia. The process of acquiring 126 Medium Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) was initiated in 2001, a process after which the Rafale aircraft was selected in January 2012. However, due to contractual issues, only 36 could be ordered, and the same physically arrived in India in 2020. The very slow decision-making for weapon acquisitions put India in a poor light and national security at risk.
Reminiscences of the Air Chief
Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis was the Air Chief during the Kargil War. Many years later, in October 2006, in an interview to the defence magazine Force, he recalled Operation Safed Sagar. He thought it was time to talk because General Ved Malik‘s book Kargil: From Surprise to Victory had just been published; Jaswant Singh had written A Call to Honour: In Service of Emergent India; and General Pervez Musharraf, the villain of Kargil, had published In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. All three had been major players in the Kargil conflict. It was thus time for the Air Chief to put his views in the public domain.
By 10 May, the IAF was getting informal information on some heavy activity in Kargil, but when the Army Vice Chief was approached to check if all was well, he said that the Army could handle the situation. However, the Northern Command had asked IAF elements attached to them for fire support from Mi-25/35 attack helicopters and armed Mi-17s for evicting some intruders. IAF elements in J&K responded that terrain at those altitudes was beyond the operating envelope of the gunships. Northern Command and Army HQ had made no such requests at higher levels but were upset that the request at the lower level had been rejected by the IAF. The Army Chief was on a visit abroad. Finally, when the Army Vice Chief met the IAF Chief on 14 May, he was told that the IAF required Government of India (GoI) clearance. Also, he was told that the Army must spell out the requirement, but the type of fire support will be decided by the IAF. Notwithstanding, the IAF launched reconnaissance missions by Canberras and Jaguars.
The Army needed IAF support but was reluctant to approach the MoD, possibly because of embarrassment for having allowed such a ground situation to develop, he said. It was made clear to the Army at all levels that helicopter gunships were unsuited for the operations. Meanwhile, HQ Western Air Command (WAC) started preparing contingency plans. The IAF sought an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) on a Sunday. On Monday, 17 May, the Raksha Mantri (RM) chaired a high-level meeting with the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the Principal Secretary to the PM also present. The Air Chief briefed on the escalation dynamics of air power; weapon limitations at those heights; the risk of crossing the LoC; the risk of fratricide by own troops; and that helicopter survivability would be low. On 18 May, a CCS meeting was chaired by the PM. The escalation dynamics were discussed. The IAF sought permission to use fighter aircraft without restrictions. The consensus and final direction at the end of the meeting was not to use the IAF for the moment. But the IAF continued to prepare and train.
The IAF had believed that returns from attacking small close air support targets were often low and aircraft vulnerabilities were high. Air power has a much more devastating effect when applied to logistics dumps and lines of supply. The IAF continued to accelerate logistics air support to the Army, and to fly air defence, photo, and electronic reconnaissance missions awaiting further GoI orders for offensive action. There was a total lack of Army–Air Force joint staff work. Since the Army Chief had been on an extended visit abroad, the IAF Chief wrote a detailed letter on operational issues to the Army Chief for him to read on return. Immediately on return, the Army Chief held a meeting with the other two Chiefs on 23 May and suggested that the services approach the CCS to seek IAF participation. The CCS cleared the use of fighter aircraft on 25 May but made it clear that there was to be no crossing of the LoC, despite the IAF explaining the importance. Finally, IAF air strikes during the conflict played a great role. It helped reduce Indian Army casualties and hastened the end of the war. Clearly, the Indian Army was the lead service in the operations, and the IAF was mainly in a support role, the Air Chief acknowledged.
The KRC and GoM Report Status
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) was set up by the GoI on 29 July 1999, three days after the official end of the Kargil War. It was chaired by eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam. The KRC noted that the role of the IAF in support of the Army in Kargil was a significant development with far-reaching consequences for the Pakistani intruders, albeit the IAF was committed to action after considerable delay. A Group of Ministers (GoM) and task forces were set up thereafter. The GoM findings clearly stated that the intrusion came as a surprise to the Indian government. The report highlighted the role of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Intelligence Bureau (IB), and military intelligence just prior to the war, and the lack of inter-agency coordination. RAW‘s human intelligence was found to be weak. The report discussed possible Siachenisation of Kargil, meaning full-time manning of all posts. The same has since been done. The GoM suggested a thorough review of the entire national security system, covering the National Security Council (NSC), intelligence, counter-terrorist operations, border management, defence budget and modernisation, apex decision-making, nuclear policy, media relations, information technology, and civil-military liaison.
Based on the report, a full-time NSA has been instituted. Improved aerial surveillance using Indian RISAT satellites and UAVs has been put in place. A centralised communication and electronic intelligence agency, the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), was set up in 2004. The Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) has been set up. Think tanks such as the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS) were set up. Some recommendations have still not been fully implemented due to persistent differences between the Army, Indian Navy, and IAF, and the unwillingness of the political class to enact the binding legislation. The GoM had recommended the formation of the post of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and it was accepted by the CCS and finally implemented with the appointment of the first CDS in 2020. Based on the recommendations, the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the Nuclear Command Authority, the Strategic Forces Command, the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare, the Defence Technical Council, and the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) were set up. Among the recommendations not fully implemented is entrusting Internal Security (IS)/Counter-Insurgency (CI) duties entirely to Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and the Rashtriya Rifles, thus de-inducting the Army from these duties wherever possible. The Naresh Chandra task force was set up in 2007 to follow up on the KRC recommendations, and it submitted a report on 23 May 2012. Two key action points were having a permanent Chairman of the COSC and formal integration of service HQs with the MoD with cross-postings. Both of these still have to be implemented.
An Air Warrior Assessment
Defence analyst and retired Air Marshal B.D. Jayal feels that the political, bureaucratic, military, and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo. The Chiefs of Staff Committee should have conducted its own classified in-house review of the operations, lessons learnt, and individual or institutional failures, but the same seems not to have happened. In an age where air power is driving strategic and tactical options, ignoring the role of the Air Force in managing a hostile LoC in peacetime, and relegating it to the sidelines, he felt, indicates a national security mindset that remains frozen in the 1962 era. Tactical and armed reconnaissance can be handled better by the IAF with Tac R equipment optimised for such missions. Neither the battleground nor the air environment, and certainly not the enemy, were surprises. The fact that the Pakistani Army intruded against the so-called ‘understandable’ mindset of its foes only goes to show their tactical shrewdness, studying their adversary’s weaknesses and exploiting them with surprise. The IAF, despite having conducted a major exercise in this sector only a month before the crisis, lost two fighters and one helicopter before even finding its feet. This was not a professional beginning. The inter-service rivalries seem to be dissipating scarce energy. The archaic higher security organisation must carry a large share of the blame, he says.
Independent Foreign Assessment on Air Power
Benjamin Lambeth published a book, Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War, in September 2012. The Kargil conflict was a milestone event in Indian military history and one that represents a telling prototype of India’s most likely type of future combat challenge, he wrote. Some of the salient takeaways from the book sum up the Kargil air war. Due to the surprise nature of the incursion, it took many days of heated discussions between the IAF and the Indian Army to decide what role each service would have in repelling the Pakistanis, and the boundaries remained hazy throughout the conflict. There were gaping holes in India’s nationwide real-time intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability that had allowed the incursion to go undetected for many days.
The IAF had not trained sufficiently for combat operations in the extraordinary high altitudes as faced in Kargil. Targets were uncommonly hard to spot, and weapons systems behaved differently than at lower altitudes. The IAF pilots creatively used air strikes to create avalanches or rockslides to block Pakistani supply lines. Within a few weeks, the IAF was able to leverage advances in navigation, surveillance, and targeting technology and successfully adapted its more advanced Mirage 2000 aircraft to the conflict to force a Pakistani retreat. Jugaad (frugal engineering) and adaptability were the hallmarks. The Aircraft and Systems Testing Establishment (ASTE) in Bengaluru helped integrate Israeli-made Litening electro-optical targeting pods onto the Mirage 2000H and Jaguar fighters, and also modified the Mirage 2000H’s centerline weapons station to carry 1,000-pound U.S.-made Paveway II LGBs.
Significant asymmetry with the IAF’s far superior numbers dissuaded the PAF from any attempt to challenge its air superiority. Beyond the visible combat capabilities, a lot was achieved in managing intra-theater airlift. IAF fighters were driven to employ target attack tactics using ingress and egress headings that were not optimal. Had the IAF been permitted to cross the LoC, it could have spared the Indian Army the need for its costly frontal assault by attacking their source of resupply in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. That, however, would have risked escalation to a wider war, perhaps one involving the PAF. Nearly invisible humans well dug into hideouts did not make a good target from the air. As such, close air support paid fewer dividends than hitting logistic nodes. After every mission, the Army gave the IAF the results of the attack. In about 70 percent of the missions, the IAF was told ‘bombs on target’. Pakistan did not expect the combat involvement of Indian airpower.
The criticality of IR flares as an active counter-measure against any enemy infrared-guided missiles was learnt the hard way after a helicopter was lost. In all, enemy forces fired more than 100 surface-to-air missiles at IAF aircraft throughout the conflict. Yet no further aircraft were downed or sustained battle damage. The Kargil conflict demonstrated that airpower could be potentially very effective in mountain warfare at high altitudes. It will become more so in the context of China. Kargil also provided insights into the IAF’s capabilities, limitations, and relations with its sister services. It highlighted areas requiring improvements.
This was the first and only serious clash between two nuclear powers that had a clear winner. PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s directive not to cross the LoC did prevent escalation. The Kargil War also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea. Pakistan should think twice about the limits of its nuclear deterrent. The possibility of future sharp, intense, brief, and limited-stakes conventional wars with Pakistan and China exists, and India must plan and prepare accordingly. Immediately after Kargil began a significant process to convert the IAF from a sub-continental tactical to an intercontinental strategic aerospace power with 4th-generation fighters, force-extending tankers, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) capability, inter-theater airlifters, UAVs, and the beginnings of a military space surveillance capability. India‘s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance deficiency has since been substantially improved with indigenous reconnaissance satellites with sub-one-metre resolution, and space-based synthetic aperture radar capability. The Indian Army‘s constant vigil using Israeli Searcher and Heron UAVs and deploying five times a larger number of troops permanently in the Kargil sector has made a difference.
Kargil Air War Lessons – Way Ahead
Immediately after the war, the IAF began a significant acquisition process. It acquired a large number of Su-30MKI and upgraded its MiG-29 and Mirage 2000 aircraft. It acquired aerial tankers, AEW&C capability, inter-theater airlifters, UAVs, and the beginnings of a military space surveillance capability. A key requirement of the IAF was modern fighter aircraft to maintain clear superiority over the PAF. Despite the immediate initiation of the case to acquire 126 aircraft, unfortunately, the IAF is now down to an all-time low of below 30 fighter squadrons. A fresh case for 114 Rafale fighters is in process. With current acquisition processes, the numbers may start improving only around 2030. The IAF may reach its authorised squadron strength of 42 only around 2038. The IAF, meanwhile, is ensuring that all aerial platforms being acquired are capable of high-altitude warfare, including attack helicopters, and fighters are fit to operate at six kilometres plus. The new attack helicopters would be armed with reasonable stand-off weapons. Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs) are critical weapons for modern aerial weapon delivery. Dumb bombs used with ingenuity can be devastating, especially for HQs, logistic nodes, and other interdiction targets. The IAF needs at least ten AEW&C aircraft of the A-50 Phalcon class and 10 of the DRDO Netra class. India must accelerate LCA Mk1A induction, and development of LCA Mk2 and the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) fifth-generation fighter by allocating More resources on priority.
SAM threats have to be factored in. MANPADS can be moved to high mountain tops. IR flares and electronic countermeasures (ECM) are critical during operations. The IAF lacked high-altitude firing ranges for training. Even training was insufficient. The situation on this count hasn’t changed much. Air reconnaissance and battle damage assessment are crucial for air operations to plan subsequent attacks. Such ability exists. Interdiction targets pay greater dividends as opposed to Battlefield Air Strikes (BAS) targets. BAS is also risky, as there are many air defence (AD) weapons with all the armies. Airborne Forward Air Controllers (FAC) in Cheetah helicopters were of great help for air attacks. Air power made a great difference to the ground operations, as acknowledged by field commanders of the Indian Army. It greatly helped reduce ground casualties and compress victory timelines. Operational and technical ingenuity and imagination find solutions to problems discovered during wartime uncertainties. These have invariably won wars. Air defence escorts and area Combat Air Patrol by day and night proved an effective deterrent, which ensured total air superiority. At times, PAF F-16s orbited just 15 km (on their own side of the LoC) from IAF strike formations attacking Pakistani targets, and were kept at bay by our own air defence fighters flying a protective pattern above the strike.
One of the valuable lessons that emerged from the Kargil War was the need for closer joint Army–Air Force planning and consultations from the very beginning. The Army must seek IAF support more readily. Intelligence assets like UAVs can be operated in coordination with each other. Thankfully, field-level close IAF–Army coordination was clearly visible as the operations unfolded. More joint operational training in a real sense is required. Each service must get the others on board at the highest level at the earliest. MoD-Service HQ integration is a critical recommendation still to be implemented. Could the creation of the position of the Chief of Defence Staff have overseen and adjudicated inter-service differences when it comes to the apportionment of military roles and resources, is being asked. Service HQs must use the services of think tanks to generate approach papers.
The issue of the nuclear overhang in a conventional conflict had been well settled after Kargil. India can expect and must train for future short conventional wars in the mountains with Pakistan and China. Lessons from this high-altitude Kargil War would apply to all the world’s air forces, for it is the first time in the history of military aviation that such an air operation took place in such an environment where conventional, long-accepted air power theories no longer held good.
Notes
1. Op Safed Sagar, IAF Official Site http://indianairforce.nic.in/content/op-safed-sagar
2. 1999 Kargil Conflict
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil-99.htm
3. Bofors power proved in Kargil War https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kargil-winning-the-battle-with-bofors-331307-2016-07-25
4. Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis interview, Force Magazine Volume 4 No 2 October 2006
5. Report of the Kargil Review Committee: An Appraisal https://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1400824637Report%20of%2the%20Kargil%20Review%20Committee%20%20CJ%20SSummer%202009.pdf
6. The Kargil Review Committee Report by Air Marshal BD Jayal https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/idr/vol_15(2)/air_marshal_bd_jayal_retd.htm
7. Airpower at 18,000’: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War by Benjamin Lambeth https://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20/airpower-at-18-000-indian-air-force-in-kargil-war-pub-49421
The article was first written for a CLAWS book on Kargil, “Surprise Strategy and `Vijay`: 20 Years of Kargil and Beyond,” published in 2020.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
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