After 2000, US-India security and defence engagement shifted from post-nuclear estrangement to a deep strategic partnership. Driven by post-9/11 counter-terrorism and a shared concern over China’s rise, defence trade surged from near-zero to over $22 billion, supported by foundational military agreements and joint Indo-Pacific frameworks.
The United States and India are the world’s oldest and largest democracies, respectively. The United States is the world’s largest economy and consumer. They own leading technologies. The Indian diaspora in the United States comprises over 5 to 6 million people. It is one of the highest-earning, best-educated, and most influential ethnic groups. The United States is India’s largest export market, accounting for roughly 20 per cent of total Indian goods exports, amounting to nearly $97–$100 billion annually, despite recent tariff fluctuations and trade policy challenges. The United States is India‘s largest destination for defence exports, accounting for 45 per cent of the total. Exports to the United States largely consist of advanced sub-systems, components, and aero-structures.
But, of late, a notable trust deficit has emerged in India-US relations, driven by aggressive American tariff policies, shifts in regional security approaches, and complex strategic differences. Differing positions on regional conflicts, policy shifts toward China, and Washington’s re-engagement with Pakistan have heightened caution in New Delhi.
India-US Foundational Agreements
In 2005, the two sides signed a 10-year defence framework pact (renewed in 2015 and 2025) to expand military exercises, co-production, and defence trade. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA 2016) allows reciprocal access to military logistics and supplies. The Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA 2018) enabled secure, interoperable communication between both militaries. The Industrial Security Agreement (ISA 2019) facilitated the sharing of classified defence technology between private and public contractors. The United States recognised India with a unique status as a “Major Defence Partner” (2016), matching its closest allies and smoothing bureaucratic clearance for defence items. In 2018, India was elevated to Strategic Trade Authorization Tier-1 (STA-1 Status), granting licence-free access to a wide pool of dual-use and military technology. The Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) is a legally non-binding agreement (2024) which commits both nations to provide reciprocal priority support for defence-related goods and services during emergencies, peacetime, or conflicts.
The [suspicious link removed] was revitalised and elevated to a leader-level security architecture to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Indo-US Nuclear Deal (2008) ended three decades of India’s global nuclear isolation, setting up civil-nuclear trade. The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET 2023) deepened cooperation in AI, quantum computing, semiconductors, and defence space systems.
USA the Lead Importer of Indian-Manufactured Aero-Structures and Components
India is rapidly emerging as a primary global hub for aerospace manufacturing, exporting roughly $2 billion in aircraft components annually. American aerospace giants like Boeing source over $1.25 billion of parts yearly from an expansive network of Indian Tier-1 to Tier-3 suppliers, driven by Western production backlogs and, more importantly, advanced local engineering capabilities. Capacity constraints across US and European manufacturing hubs have forced OEMs to diversify supply chains.
Major American aircraft aero-structures manufactured in India include F-16 aircraft wings, complete AH-64 Apache helicopter fuselages; CH-47 Chinook helicopter crown and tail-cone structures; vertical fin structures, fan cowls, and subcomponents for the Boeing 737; complex composite floor beams for the Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner; and P-8I Neptune composite panels for power/mission equipment cabinets and auxiliary power unit (APU) door fairings. An Indian company produces tactical transport parts and structural assemblies for the global C-130 supply chain in India.
Sikorsky S-92 helicopter cabins are manufactured in India through a joint venture between Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation. Located in Hyderabad, this facility produces fully indigenous cabins and over 5,000 precision components, which are then shipped to the United States for final aircraft assembly. Various sheet metal parts, detailed parts, and assemblies are supplied by Tier-1 providers. Key domestic players like the Tata Group, Dynamatic Technologies, Azad Engineering, Mahindra Aerostructures, and Jeh Aerospace build core structural components and sub-assemblies. Manufacturing has shifted from small, simple parts to complex, multi-metre aero-structures and sub-systems processed from super-alloys and high-grade aluminium. The Indian aerospace components market is projected to surge from $1.5 billion up to $4 billion by FY29 at a 28 per cent CAGR.
HAL’s GE 404 Contracts for Mk1A
General Electric delivered a total of 65 F404 engines (including initial test variants and the production F404-IN20) to Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to support the development, flight testing, and induction of the initial 40 LCA Tejas Mk1 aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
HAL signed a roughly $716 million contract for 99 F404-GE-IN20 engines in 2021 for the initial 83 Tejas Mk1A. The engines have been trickling in at a slow rate due to reported supply chain issues. Only 7 engines were delivered as of July 2026, with GE promising an accelerated delivery of 20 to 22 more units by the end of 2026. This has forced HAL to invoke contractual penalty clauses.
HAL ordered an additional 113 engines for nearly $1 billion in November 2025 after the IAF signed a deal for 97 more Mk1As. The engines will be supplied in the period from 2027 to 2032.
GE-414 Engine and Major Issues
The General Electric F414 is an American afterburning turbofan engine in the 22,000-pound (98 kN) thrust class. The F414 originated from GE‘s widely used F404 turbofan, enlarged and improved for use in the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet. It is renowned for exceptional reliability and is heavily exported for twin- and single-engine 4.5th-generation fighters. F414 variants power the Saab JAS-39E/F Gripen and the South Korean KAI KF-21 Boramae. The F414-GE-INS6 is the variant selected for use on the HAL Tejas Mk2. It is also proposed for the HAL TEDBF and initial variants of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA). Interestingly, the GE 414 is among the top engines of its class in terms of performance.
For applications requiring enhanced performance without airframe redesigns, GE Aerospace offers upgraded variants of the F414. The F414-GE-39E is specifically tailored for the Saab JAS 39E Gripen, focusing on increased thrust and fuel efficiency without increasing the engine’s external dimensions. The F414 Enhanced Performance Engine (EPE) offers up to 26,400 lbf (116 kN) of thrust, delivering a 20 per cent power boost over the standard model while keeping an identical physical footprint.
The GE F414 India aero-engine deal is now centred on soaring commercial costs and production demands. While India and the US previously agreed on a landmark technology transfer for the engine, commercial negotiations have hit a major roadblock over surging price quotes, causing uncertainty for flagship indigenous fighter projects.
Initial estimates had placed the cost of each F414 engine around ₹70 to ₹80 crore. However, during commercial negotiations, GE Aerospace quoted prices nearly three times higher, exceeding ₹200 crore per unit. Alongside engine costs, GE reportedly sought an investment exceeding $800 million (nearly ₹6,000 crore) to establish a dedicated assembly and manufacturing line in India. While the broad technical agreement, which featured a massive 80 per cent transfer of technology, was previously finalised, the finer economic and logistical details of producing, servicing, and sustaining these engines locally have now become major sticking points.
Because the AMCA and Tejas Mk2 airframes have already been designed around the exact dimensions and specs of the GE F414, switching to an entirely different engine at this late stage would require costly, time-consuming structural and software adaptations, and testing. The combination of elevated unit costs and lengthy commercial negotiations threatens the development and induction timelines of these aircraft, which are desperately needed to maintain and regain the IAF squadron strength.
Due to the standoff, Indian defence agencies (DRDO and ADA) have started exploring alternative engine collaborations, holding preliminary talks with international aerospace companies like Safran (France) and Rolls-Royce (UK) as a backup. Choices are complex and need a closer look. With the GE 404 engine already powering the LCA Mk1 and Mk1A, has India put all its eggs in an unreliable American basket?
India’s Aero-Engine Road Map Ahead
Only the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China make aero-engines of their own. Japan, South Korea, and Germany make aero-engines jointly with US manufacturers. The technologies are guarded, and no one shares them with the non-haves. Following the GE engine delays and questions regarding the level of technology transfer, India, the fourth most powerful military and the fastest-growing large economy, has decided to go for the indigenous aero-engine route.
India’s aero-engine road map focuses on achieving technological self-reliance through a dual-track strategy, reviving domestic designs like the Kaveri 2.0 and Dry Kaveri via the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), while pursuing high-thrust co-development partnerships with major global aerospace firms like France‘s Safran and the UK‘s Rolls-Royce to power advanced platforms like the AMCA stealth fighter.
Kaveri 2.0 is targeted at generating 90–100 kN of thrust, aiming to serve as a mid-life upgrade path for light combat platforms. A non-afterburning variant, the Kaveri Derivative Engine (KDE), will be adapted to power indigenous unmanned combat aerial vehicles like the DRDO Ghatak drone. Proposals by industry bodies like SIDM suggest building a national 120 kN core engine ecosystem catering to both military aviation and single-aisle civil aviation.
GTRE and Safran are partnering to focus on a 120 kN-class engine with a growth path to 140 kN, emphasising intellectual property transfer for future fighter fleets. India’s Reliance Industries and Rolls-Royce are partnering on co-developing a 120 kN-class combat engine core with localised Indian ownership and supply chain expansion.
India will rely on GE F404 and co-produced F414 engines for initial Tejas Mk1A and Mk2 variants while long-term domestic high-thrust testing matures.
No American Fighter Aircraft in India’s Current Plans
India’s current fighter aircraft fleet includes the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, MiG-29, SEPECAT Jaguar, Dassault Rafale, and Tejas Mk1. India has committed to 180 LCA Mk1A. The IAF has projected a requirement for 120 to 130 Tejas Mk2 fighter jets, and subsequent orders could push the total procurement higher toward 200. The IAF wants 120 to 150 aircraft (roughly seven fighter squadrons) of the indigenous AMCA, with the possibility to expand the overall fleet size up to 250 over time. India seems to be pushing ahead with 114 Make-in-India Rafales as part of its Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) requirement. There were three American aircraft—Lockheed Martin’s F-21, the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and the F-15EX Eagle II—in the MRFA contention.
India has shown no interest in American fifth-generation aircraft, the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. Also, the USA is not ready to offer the aircraft to any country operating the Russian S-400 Triumf air defence system. It is clear that there is no American fighter aircraft in India’s current plans.
Major Foreign Sub-systems in LCA Mk1A
The LCA Tejas Mk1A incorporates some major foreign-sourced systems. These include the GE Aerospace F404-IN20 aero-engine (United States), the Elta EL/M-2052 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) fire control radar (Israel Aerospace Industries / Elta Systems, Israel), the Elisra Electronic Warfare Suite / Self-Protection Jammer (Elbit Systems / Elisra, Israel), and the Martin-Baker IN16G zero-zero ejection seat (UK).
AMCA Remains Relatively Free of US Technologies
Other than the initial aero-engines, the AMCA is relatively free of US sub-systems. The core airframe design, flight control software, structural composites, and primary sensor suites (GaN-based AESA radar) of the AMCA are developed indigenously or through alternative European partnerships, making it largely free of direct major US hardware. However, a modern fighter relies on global supply chains for microelectronics, commercial off-the-shelf computer silicon components, and specific subsystem sub-tier parts. While major tactical systems are sovereign, claiming a strict 100 per cent absence of any global or minor US-origin micro-components is difficult for any modern complex aerospace project. India has chosen the private sector route for the AMCA, and the final selected consortia will have to look at the technologies in the long term. The import authorisation of all strategically important components and technologies will be through government approval.
Reluctance for American Fighter Aircraft
India‘s reluctance to induct American fighter aircraft stems from a profound trust deficit rooted in unpredictable supply chains, strict end-user monitoring, and reluctance over deep technology transfer. Recent friction over delivery delays for GE aero-engines, high lifecycle costs, and a preference for strategic autonomy have reinforced New Delhi‘s decision to bypass high-end US fighters.
American defence sales come with rigid end-user monitoring agreements and centralised maintenance control, which can limit India’s freedom to deploy or independently repair assets during geopolitical emergencies. Recent bottlenecks and cost escalations involving GE engine supplies have highlighted the risks of relying on US manufacturing timelines. Washington remains legally and structurally restricted from sharing core source codes, critical manufacturing know-how, and deep intellectual property, conflicting with India’s Aatmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) and indigenous defence programmes.
Platforms such as the F-35 carry massive acquisition and hourly operating costs compared to alternative multirole fighters or upgraded heavy platforms already backbone-tested in the IAF. Buying front-line fighters risks entangling India in US sanction frameworks (such as CAATSA complications regarding the legacy Russian inventory) and compromises India‘s traditional multi-aligned foreign policy.
To Summarise
The USA has heavily entered India’s military aviation ecosystem through the delivery of C-17 Globemaster III strategic heavy airlifters, C-130J Super Hercules, maritime patrol aircraft P-8I Poseidon, AH-64E Apache attack helicopters, CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters, MH-60R Seahawk multi-role maritime helicopters, and MQ-9B SeaGuardian / Predator high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) drones. All these aircraft have been relevant and have added to India’s military might.
The Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules, offered via a partnership with Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL), is a primary contender in the IAF’s roughly ₹1 lakh crore ($12 billion) Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) programme to procure 60 to 80 airlifters.
The United States enforces strict legal, technical, and logistical restrictions on foreign operators of American fighter jets, primarily through ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and FMS (Foreign Military Sales) contracts. While the US does not have a physical “kill switch” to remotely disable jets mid-flight, it retains immense leverage over foreign fleets.
The United States regulates the foreign operation of American-made fighter jets through legally binding End-Use Monitoring (EUM) programmes like Golden Sentry. For Pakistan, F-16 sales are strictly restricted to counterterrorism and defence, forbidding unauthorised forward deployments, third-party technology transfers, or offensive conventional use against neighbours like India without Washington‘s explicit prior approval.
The Pressler Amendment, a 1985 US law, banned military and economic aid to Pakistan unless the US President annually certified that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. President George H.W. Bush failed to issue this certification in October 1990, triggering strict sanctions that froze bilateral military sales.
Following India and Pakistan‘s May 1998 nuclear tests, the US imposed mandatory economic and military sanctions under Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act (the Glenn Amendment). These measures cut off non-humanitarian foreign aid, stopped military sales and financing, barred US bank loans, and forced opposition to international bank loans.
India is avoiding buying American fighter aircraft to preserve its strategic autonomy, avoid the rigid legal constraints of the United States military framework and restrictive end-use monitoring, prevent supply chain and operational vulnerabilities, and protect domestic aerospace initiatives. Relying on Washington for frontline combat jets creates long-term geopolitical and practical risks.
Note: The article was originally written by the Author for The Eurasian Times on 23rd August 2026; it has since been updated.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
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