The Trump administration is secretly working with Russia on a peace plan to end the Ukraine war. The 28-point plan will deal with peace in Ukraine, security guarantees, security in Europe, and future US relations with Russia and Ukraine. Russia, too, seems to be optimistic. Trump’s envoy Witkoff and Russian envoy Kirill Dmitrieve, along with their teams, are huddled up and working on a draft. The two are taking forward the principles that US President Donald Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to in Alaska. Trump has sent US Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, along with two four-star US Army generals, to hold talks with Ukrainian President Zelensky and his officials. This team will then proceed to Moscow for more open military-brokered negotiations.
All this is happening amidst Russia’s definite additional successes on the battlefield. Kyiv and European partners are clearly not amused with what is going on behind their backs. It is interesting to first understand the ground positions in Ukraine.
Ground Situation in Ukraine
As of mid-November 2025, the war in Ukraine was in a state of attrition with active fighting concentrated in the east and south, where Russia was making slow, steady gains in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia oblasts while Ukraine tried to push back in the north of Kharkiv. Russia occupied approximately 19 percent of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.
In Donetsk Oblast, Russia‘s primary focus was on the key logistics hub of Pokrovsk, which was then under heavy assault, with Russian forces attempting to complete its encirclement. Russian forces had also advanced near the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and were contesting the strategically important town of Chasiv Yar. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the situation in the Hulyaipole direction remained serious, with Russian forces advancing and maintaining intensified offensive operations. Ukrainian forces had reported some success in pushing back Russian efforts to seize islands in the Velyki Kuchuhury reserve.
In Kharkiv Oblast, in May 2024, Russia launched a new northern offensive to create a buffer zone along its border. Russian forces had advanced near Vovchansk and Lyptsi; however, Ukraine had reported successfully pushing back Russian efforts to seize Kupyansk. In Luhansk Oblast, Russia controlled the majority of the region and had been pushing toward Kupyansk as part of its efforts to control the entirety of the Donbas region.
In August 2024, Ukraine launched a cross-border incursion into Russia‘s Kursk Oblast, capturing some territory to force Russia to divert troops from the east. While Russia claimed to have recaptured roughly half of the lost territory, Ukraine still held a small foothold. Both sides continued to use long-range missile and drone attacks. Ukraine had conducted significant drone strikes on Russian infrastructure, including oil refineries and military airbases deep within Russian territory. Russia continued to launch widespread air strikes on Ukrainian cities and critical energy infrastructure.
Broad Insights into the War
The conflict remains rapidly evolving. The battlefield ground action, strategic strikes, information operations, and industrial production surges remain crucial to both Ukraine’s and Russia’s war efforts. Their defence budgets have shot up. Little is left for Ukraine to spend on welfare schemes. Aid is thinning down. Many promises by Western Nations take long to fructify. Both sides continue to innovate war-making tactics and technologies. In the process, the rest of the world is learning and reviewing force structures and weapon stocking. The uninhabited aerial systems (UAS) and drones have got everyone thinking and imbibing. Anti-drone systems have evolved and are seeing high success. So, while drones are significant, they are no longer the end-all solution. Space has become a great enabler for all combat operations. Humans remain important. Boots on the ground will hold territory. Very long-range precision strike is here to stay. Air Defence (AD) systems have assumed an even greater role. This includes the Counter UAS (C-UAS) grid.
Long-Range Precision Strike Operations
The Ukraine war has shown the need for a robust deep-strike capability. Op Sindoor too demonstrated the IAF’s success in long-range precision strikes. Such strikes require effective and accurate current intelligence, and weapons that can dodge enemy air defences in an electronic counter measures environment. The commanders need battle damage assessment (BDA), and the world wants proof of success. While Russia may have targeted Ukrainian energy infrastructure to break the will of the people, Ukraine targeted Russian oil refineries and strategic airfields. All this requires planning and weapon-to-target matching. While NATO supported Ukraine against Russia, China supported Pakistan against India. New and innovative strike and penetration techniques have to be worked out constantly, week after week.
Human intelligence (HUMINT) has been effectively used in the Ukraine conflict, and the same will be important for the India–Pakistan context. Satellites will play a greater role. India needs to have more Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites with a shorter revisit time. While Ukrainian strikes may not break the back of the huge Russian military complex, it does have a morale-related effect. In the case of Pakistan, the IAF’s targeting of 12 airbases and a few radar sites made a nearly 20 percent dent in capability.
Normally, Indian strikes could have resulted in a strike-counter-strike spiral, but that did not happen as the Pakistani military lacked the capability and their security establishment was too scared of escalation. Also, the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and a strong networked Air Defence system was a big deterrent, and did neutralise the strikes that came across.
Russia has the advantage of defence in depth. They can play around in terms of moving or positioning strategic assets. India, too, has such an advantage. Pakistan is now sandwiched between India and a not-so-friendly Afghanistan.
Drone Saturation in the Air
The entire border is flooded with drones and C-UAS units or individual operators. These are mostly first-person view (FPV) and Kamikaze drones with ranges maximum up to 10-15 kilometres. Soft-top vehicles are highly vulnerable. Even tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery positions are vulnerable and threatened. Soldiers are thus forced to move on foot, delaying operational action. Foot soldiers are now moving in smaller teams and often with thermal blankets as an anti-Infra-Red (IR) measure. Tactical command posts and centres are being built underground to counter this threat.
Russians have positioned powerful electronic jammers, ten kilometres apart, all across the front. Both sides are using decoys and other deception means to waste adversary effort. Whether Pakistan can match such heavy drone deployments remains a question mark. India must greatly increase drone inventories and work out appropriate tactics. Drones can also be effective in the mountains, though dynamics and capabilities in the Himalayas will be different. A few dedicated drone battalions may be required with each army division. All long-range drones and loitering munitions beyond the 50-60 range must be with the air force so as not to duplicate the effort.
Uninhabited ground combat vehicles have also been used, but these have been less successful, and are best only for forward logistics, resupply, and casualty evacuation. On the other hand, sea drones have been successfully employed by Ukraine to keep the Russian navy and ports under threat. The Indian Navy will need to invest much more in these.
Ukraine was once lauded for out-of-the-box thinking, but Russia today is outdoing them on that score. Russia has introduced fibre-optic controlled drones in growing numbers which allow continuous high-definition imagery for targeting. Russia has also standardized drone production around just a few models. This eases logistics and stocking. India must do the same. This has logistics, training, and production implications. Specialised Russian drone units have mastered tactics and targeting and see Ukrainian drone control centres as centres of gravity, and are being targeted. The Indian military must look at this possibility.
Drones Don’t Replace Humans
Drones are a small subset of the Ukraine war. Like the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, they have seen prominence. Human-operated aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and logisticians continue to be more relevant in Ukraine. Drones cannot replace a soldier holding ground or the pilot in the aircraft. Large UAS like the MQ-9 cost no less than a modern fighter aircraft. UAS will only augment crewed aircraft as part of Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). They will continue to take on the “Dull, Dirty, and Dangerous” missions. With improved technologies, drones and C-UAS are fast reaching parity. Clearly, the Indian Armed Forces and Think-Tanks need to look at the drone matrix and their capability to extend existing capabilities, rather than replacing inhabited systems.
Loitering Munitions a Success Story
The scale and technological sophistication of the jet-powered Shahed drones used by Russia has also increased significantly. The total number of long-range drones used increased manifold. Russia also improved electronic hardening and the navigation systems of the drones. Much faster, jet-powered drones are difficult to intercept. Russia has stepped up production, and can now produce around 35,000 Shahed drones per year, and proposes to scale up to 40,000 per year by 2030.
This is an important lesson for India. The Shahed-136 drone has an operational range of up to 1,500 km. The cost of a Shahed-136 drone is estimated to be around $50,000 to produce domestically, but an export price of around $193,000 per unit has been reported even for a large purchase. Most Shahed raids are accompanied by smaller numbers of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Shahed drones are difficult to detect and more complex to intercept. India used the much more sophisticated and powerful IAI Harop loitering munition, which costs around $500,000. It has a communications range of 200 km, an operational range of 1000 km, an endurance of up to 9 hours, and an on-board explosive payload of 23kg. The Israeli-designed, Made-in-India SkyStriker autonomous loitering munition used by the Indian Army costs around $105,000 and has a range of around 100 kilometres. Clearly, India needs a mix with a larger number of Shahed-class drones.
Capability to Adapt and Innovate
Battles over centuries have taught us the need to adapt and innovate, especially in an extended conflict. Whether it is technology or tactics, there is a need to learn and adapt. Russia was quick to do this after some initial reverses. Russia used airborne and satellite recce to find front-line gaps to plan intrusions. Glide bombs and Kamikaze drones were used to create gaps where they did not exist. Russia improved tactics and weapon delivery, and a great deal in electronic warfare. Service HQs must create some dedicated Cells and teams like the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Composite Battle Response and Analysis Group (COBRA) to get inputs from the field and many other sources to analyse and suggest quick or long-term remedies. India must “learn how to learn better.” Lastly, investment in technology and adaptive leadership at the highest levels will be important.
Ground-Based Air Defence
The Ukraine war saw huge success of ground-based Air Defences (GBAD) in the first year. This created a state of Aerial Denial. Despite huge air assets, Russian combat aircraft could not come even close to the border. Even the shoulder-fired MANPADS were very effective against combat helicopters. It forced Russians to use expensive stand-off weapons, cruise missiles, and loitering munitions. Russians innovated.
In view of the changing strike threat, air defence commanders must have the ability to quickly change tactics and processes. India has to strengthen attacks from the air, be it drones, cruise missiles, or tactical aviation. India has already integrated frontline and national defence, using S-400 and Akash AD systems, and a host of other legacy systems, including low-cost ones.
While India pursues the purchase of 5 more S-400 AD systems and to add many more missiles, India must accelerate the development of DRDO’s Project Kusha, the indigenous, multi-layered air defence system to counter a wide range of aerial threats. This system includes three radar and missile variants with different ranges: M1 for short-range (150 km), M2 for medium-to-long range (250 km), and M3 for long-range (up to 400 km). India also needs to further push the development of the more advanced variants of the Akash AD system.
Sanctions Failed
The West thought that economic sanctions would collapse the Russian economy, bringing about a revolt against Putin, but that has clearly failed. Putin is too strong-willed. He had done his homework. He knew Russia’s strengths and weaknesses. He continued to sell oil and gas to not only large economies like China and India, but also to Europeans and elsewhere. Alternate means were found to trade in Yuan and local currencies. Third-party routes were used to do business. In fact, a strong move for de-Dollarization was initiated, pushing the Americans to panic. Putin could get weapons from Iran and North Korea. China continued to give global geopolitical support. India sided or played neutral. The lesson for India is to build a sanction-proof economy.
28 Point Peace Plan
Russia continued to gain ground. If the West had not goaded Ukraine into a war and met Putin’s conditions put forward in November 2021, Ukraine would have had a much better deal. The West sunk billions into a losing war. The Ukrainian population is already suffering war fatigue, and so is the Western world. Putin’s continued success and war-waging stamina created conditions for a Russia-favourable end to the war.
The Trump-initiated 28-point peace deal will meet all the Russian conditions, or even more. Ukraine‘s sovereignty will be confirmed, and a comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. Territories, including Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk, will be recognised as de facto Russian, including by the United States. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean recognition along the line of contact. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries, and NATO will not expand further. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees from the USA, for which Ukraine will compensate. The USA will also help rebuild Ukraine.
The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be reduced and limited to 600,000 personnel from the current 850,000 personnel. Ukraine would have to agree to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO. NATO will also pass such a resolution. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days. Ukraine will be eligible for European Union (EU) membership. All sanctions on Russia will be removed. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy. Russia will also be invited to re-join the G8. The nuclear treaties will be extended or renegotiated.
To Summarise
The means of prosecution of war are changing. Air is becoming the primary means, but finally, boots on the ground are required. There is significant action in naval warfare. Asymmetric advantages have to be harnessed. There will be simultaneous operations in multiple domains. Dominating the electromagnetic spectrum will be mandatory. Cyber space will see high action. Space dominance will directly impact outcomes in all domains and operations.
There will be nothing like a short and swift war unless conflict termination is managed early enough. Weapon inventories will have to match. Greater investment in loitering munitions and other stand-off weapons will be required. Industrial capacities have to be buttressed, and surge production ability needs to be put in place. Atmanirbharta (self-reliance) will pay dividends. Foreign logistic chains would have to be secured and redundancies put in place. Technological and tactical innovation will bring success.
Military capability takes time to build. India has to focus not only on the large adversary, China, but a two-front war. Intelligence, economic, information, and diplomatic domains remain a crucial element of any war. Defence budgets would have to go up. The Time to Act is Now, lest we are left in the lurch later.
Header Picture Credit: Representative Image Generated using AI
Twitter: @AirPowerAsia